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Research On Emergency Decision-making And Coordination Strategies Between Government And Enterprises Under The Influence Of Random Factors

Posted on:2021-01-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X T ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2430330611992303Subject:Logistics engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the frequent occurrence of emergencies has greatly threatened the stability of society and country,its losses and impacts further expanded in China.All parties in the society are paying more and more attention to emergency management.Based on the current situation of emergency rescue and disaster relief in China,this study analyzed the charitable motives and social responsibilities with enterprises as the research object.As a result,this study found that the motivation of charitable behaviors was not simple via the game analysis between the government and enterprises in emergency rescue and disaster relief.The paper firstly assumed that in a simple system composed of the government and companies,the government was in a dominant position with the enterprise as a subsidiary and its charitable donations for disaster relief would bring charitable good and advertising effects both acting on consumers.In addition,a simple system composed of government and disaster relief companies is affected by random factors.For example,on the one hand,when the political and cultural environment or humanities activities of the system are different,the coordinated disaster relief strategy of government and enterprises will change accordingly.On the other hand,the coordinated disaster relief strategy of government and enterprises will also be affected by the extent of their disaster relief efforts.Further,under the influence of random factors on the government-enterprise collaborative disaster relief strategy,this paper established three stochastic differential game models of Nash non-cooperative game,cost-sharing Stackelberg game and cooperative cooperative contract game and then calculated the optimal disaster relief strategy and revenue in these three situations.The study found that in the case of collaborative cooperation,the expected value and variance was the largest while the expected and value in the case of cost sharing and no cost sharing was the second largest and the smallest,respectively.The results shown under the influence of random factors,if the government and enterprises want to obtain higher system benefits,they need to bear greater risks at the same time.In other words,the benefits and risks are accompanied.Itwas further found that random factors interfered with the deviation and error between the true value and the expected value.However,the true value fluctuated around the expected value and was controlled within a limited range under a certain degree of credibility.In the disaster relief process of government and enterprises,the government cannot judge the true charity goodwill level of the enterprise,but can determine the expectations of charity goodwill.In the case of allowable error,the actual situation is affected by random factors.The government can make decisions and achieve planned goals based on expectations.The research and conclusions of this paper have important guiding significance for decision-making institutions' decision-making behavior in complex environment.
Keywords/Search Tags:emergencies, government and enterprise disaster relief, random factor, synergy, differential game
PDF Full Text Request
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