Evolutionary Game And Simulation Research On Heterogeneous Enterprise Greenwashing Management

Enterprises have gradually become the mainstay of green environmental protection and technological innovation.However,in the context of a conflict of social interests and corporate interests,economic interests and environmental interests,corporate greening has become an urgent issue in today's society.The thesis is based on the background of green and innovative development concepts.In the face of the government's encouragement of green development,advocating green living,the rise of greening of enterprises,imperfect government regulations of greening of enterprises,and environmental issues are still outstanding.Based on the related literature,theoretical analysis was carried out in combination with externality theory,resource-based theory,state intervention theory,and evolutionary game theory.Secondly,based on the perspective of corporate heterogeneity,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the greening behavior of heterogeneous enterprises under government regulation,an evolutionary game model of the greening behavior of heterogeneous enterprises under government regulation,and the evolution of government participation in corporate greening governance The game model and its simulation simulation dynamic evolution game model,analyzes the strategy evolution process and its steady state.According to the research in different scenarios,it is found that:(1)the company's strategic choice is directly affected by the difference between expected returns;(2)the government punishment mechanism is an inevitable choice for the government to achieve the expected results.The government punishment mechanism can effectively control the greening behavior of enterprises and ensure the stable development of green innovation of enterprises.The necessary premise of an effective mechanism is that the government's punishment should be higher than the additional benefits of green float;(3)When there is no government regulation and the government's tax subsidy mechanism,the green float of the enterprise cannot be fully controlled;(4)enterprises in the industry The larger the power gap,the more obvious the market punishment can inhibit the greening of advantageous companies;the government's reward and punishment mechanism can promote the choice of companies toward green innovation through flexible adjustments;but in essence,the choice of corporate strategy depends on expected returns and is affected by other The influence of factors is small.From the perspective of government regulation,the paper explores the evolutionary game model of corporate greening governance under governmentless regulation,government punishment mechanism,and government tax incentive mechanism,breaks through the assumption of homogeneous enterprises,and analyzes the characteristics of heterogeneous enterprises.The stable and balanced strategies and evolutionary processes of various stakeholders in the green process,from the perspective of government regulation,provide policy recommendations for the government to achieve effective and sustainable supervision,and provide a new perspective for the current research on greening governance issues.It also provides experience for the government to formulate relevant regulations.