Research On The Game Between Government And Enterprise Under The New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policy

The development of new energy vehicles shoulders the important tasks of realizing the transformation and upgrading of the automotive industry,reducing energy consumption and alleviating environmental pollution,which determines that it has been highly valued by governments at the beginning of its development.China's new energy automobile industry has developed rapidly with the support of many government policies,among which the strong support of government subsidies has triggered an upsurge of investment in the industry.At the same time,problems such as low-end capacity agglomeration,unbalanced matching of piles,and speculation and fraud of some enterprises need to be solved urgently.What is the effect of government subsidy and what impact it will bring to the market and enterprises in the course of its downhill adjustment remains to be studied.This paper takes the government subsidy policy of new energy vehicles as the research object,focusing on the game between government and enterprise before and after the implementation and change of the subsidy policy.Firstly,after analyzing the effectiveness of government subsidy on the development of new energy automobiles and the game relationship between government and enterprises in the industry theoretically,the research ideas are put forward.By combing the evolution of China's new energy automobile subsidy policy,this paper puts forward that the specific object of this paper is the government under the government purchase subsidy policy and the new energy automobile production enterprises,and analyzes the status quo of the subsidy policy and the problems exposed in its implementation.Secondly,a three-stage dynamic game model of government-enterprise game is constructed,and the game results are analyzed and solved by using reverse induction method.On this basis,taking the different stages of industrial development as the context,this paper analyses the decision-making of government and enterprise and its influencing factors at different stages,and explores the influence of the change of subsidies policy on the market and both sides of government and enterprise.Finally,combining with the analysis and practice,the paper puts forward policy suggestions on improving policy system,strengthening punishment,dynamically adjusting technical standards of subsidies,and emphasizing policy cohesion and transition.The research shows that the new energy automobile subsidy policy based on strategic significance is only a phased policy to accelerate the development of industry;Subsidy policy is conducive to the expansion of industrial scale;in the implementation,the strategic motivation leads to the "fraud" behavior of some enterprises,which leads to the low efficiency of the game;improving the relevant standards and increasing the penalty can effectively prevent and reconcile.To solve these problems,subsidies with higher technology threshold gradually declined,to a certain extent,inhibiting the enthusiasm of enterprises' production,but can strengthen the market survival mechanism,which is more conducive to stimulating the research and development of enterprises' technology.