Research On The Game Of Government And Enterprise From The Perspective Of Joint Reward And Punishment

Asymmetry information makes it more difficult for government to regulate the activities of enterprises,and many problems are exposed concerning the traditional supervision mechanism.The average allocation of regulatory resources jeopardizes the pertinence of the regulatory activities,and the rewards and punishments of one single regulatory authority are also difficult to provide sufficient incentives or deterrents for enterprises.However,the joint reward and punishment mechanism can judge the credit level of the enterprise in advance by means of an effective credit information sharing mechanism,so as to tilt to the dishonest enterprises when allocating supervision resources.Besides,the joint participation of multiple regulatory authorities has greatly increased the intensity of rewards and punishments,which can effectively incentive honesty enterprises and deter dishonesty enterprises.The multi-dimensional cooperative supervision and governance system based on credit will inevitably have a significant impact on the game relationship between government and enterprise.Therefore,this paper studies the game between government and enterprise under the joint reward and punishment mechanism,and discusses the impact of the joint reward and punishment mechanism on the strategies of both the government and enterprises.Firstly,the impact of dynamic changes of supervision success rate over the development of government-enterprises game strategies was discussed under the joint reward and punishment mechanism.In the aim of maximizing the respective profits of enterprises and governments,the paper constructs evolutionary game models under the traditional supervision mechanism and the joint reward and punishment mechanism respectively.The evolutionary stability of unilateral strategies and mixed strategies of enterprises and governments are analyzed through analytical methods,and the influence of supervision success rate,supervision cost and the intensity of joint reward and punishment on equilibrium solution are analyzed through numerical simulation.Secondly,the impact of credit repair on government and corporate strategies is discussed because “credit repair”,another core connotation of the joint reward and punishment system,can affect the cost for the dishonesty of enterprises.Aiming at the maximization of corporate and government revenues,a differential game model is constructed.The feedback equilibrium solution is solved through analytical methods,and the influence of factors such as the natural attenuation rate of bad credit records,and the influence coefficient of bad credit records on credit repair ability are analyzed through numerical simulation.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Under the traditional supervision mechanism,both the government and the enterprise show a cyclical behavior pattern during the game,which cannot reach the equilibrium state.Nevertheless,under the joint reward and punishment mechanism the game can finally reach equilibrium.(2)Compared with the traditional regulatory mechanism,the enterprises show less dishonest behavior and more credit repair efforts,and the government show less strength of supervision under the joint reward and punishment mechanism.(3)Under the background of joint reward and punishment mechanism,the stock of bad credit records of enterprises with serious dishonesty will constantly decline in the short term,while that of enterprises with slight dishonesty will rise in the short term,and eventually the two will stabilize at the same level.(4)By improving the intensity of joint rewards and punishments,regulatory success rate,credit repair validity,the influence coefficient of bad credit records on credit repair ability,and reducing the natural attenuation rate of bad credit records,enterprises can be led to show less dishonesty and government regulation can be reduced.By reducing the government’s regulatory costs,enterprise dishonesty behavior can also be reduced,but in this case government regulation need to be improved.