Font Size: a A A

Research On The Game Of Government And Enterprise And Exit Effect In China's Photovoltaic Power Industry

Posted on:2020-11-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X GengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2370330614465130Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the implementation of the benchmark electricity price in 2007,China's subsidy policy for the photovoltaic power generation industry has been implemented for more than 10 years.These measures have greatly promoted the development of the photovoltaic industry.With the rapid increase in the installed capacity of photovoltaics,China has become the country with the largest installed capacity of photovoltaics.However,although the policy-driven industrial development has caused the scale of China's photovoltaic industry to rise rapidly,it has not brought about a synchronous increase in quality.The cost of photovoltaic power generation is still high,and the market competitiveness is not optimistic.Therefore,it is imperative to gradually withdraw from the current implementation of photovoltaic subsidies.The withdrawal of photovoltaic subsidies will force enterprises to carry out further technological research and development,which is also the policy currently being implemented by the government.From the perspective of game theory,this study proposes a method to predict the effect of policy implementation before the implementation of the policy.This method analyzes the specific subsidy exit policy by establishing a game model between the government and the enterprise.What are the strategic choices of the government and enterprises in the monopoly market and the competitive market? At the same time,based on the strategic choice of the enterprise,this paper also analyzes the expected effect of the current subsidy exit policy,and carries out modeling analysis through system simulation.In the end,it was found that the company's technology research and development enthusiasm will not be affected by the government's stated threat of reduction,but only related to the expected size of the government.At the same time,the government will pay more subsidies in the competitive market than the monopoly market to achieve the same market size.Expected goals.Finally,the subsidy exit plan currently implemented in China cannot balance the development speed of the photovoltaic industry with the enthusiasm of technology research and development of photovoltaic enterprises.It is difficult to unify government goals and corporate goals.Therefore,in order to stimulate enterprises to carry out technological research and development,it is necessary for the government to implement more detailed,more credible and more continuous policies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Game theory, Photovoltaic power generation, Subsidy exit policy
PDF Full Text Request
Related items