Study On The Game Of Interests Between Government And Enterprise In Commercial Housing Rental Market

The Party's "Nineteenth National Congress" report clearly stated that it should speed up the establishment of a multi-subject supply,multi-channel guarantee,and rent-and-purchase housing system,so that the broad masses of the people can realize their homes as soon as possible.The development of leased housing to meet the multi-level housing needs of residents,this policy has brought new opportunities and challenges for China's real estate industry.However,China's housing leasing market accounts for a small proportion of the entire real estate market.It is always on the edge of the real estate market.The total amount of institutionalized and large-scale leasing is insufficient,the relevant laws are not perfect,and the structural imbalance is serious.On the one hand,because the development of rental housing has the characteristics of large capital investment,long payback period and low return rate compared with traditional housing,real estate developers lack the motivation to participate in construction.On the other hand,real estate operators often have irregular behaviors in pursuit of profit maximization.In order to speed up capital turnover,there are incentives for illegal operation to earn extra profits.The rented houses cannot be repaired and repaired in time,affecting the rights of the lessees.Therefore,how to ensure the sound development of centralized rental housing has aroused widespread concern from government decision-making departments and academia.As an advocate and promoter of the development of the housing rental market,the government's own actions will have an impact on the strategic choices of real estate developers and operators.The lessee and the financial institution act as direct transactions with the operator,and their participation in the supervision can timely discover the operator's breach of contract.Therefore,this paper constructs a stochastic differential game model between the government and enterprises in the construction process,introduces the reputation incentive factors,and explores the interest coordination mechanism between the government and the developers.The degree of effort of both parties is taken as the control variable,and the reputation is the state variable.In turn,the Nashfri cooperative game,Stackelberg master-slave game and cooperative cooperation game are used to determine the optimal effort strategy,income level and overall optimal income of the government and developers.Constructing an evolutionary game model of government and operators in the housing leasing market under the supervision of financial institutions and lessees in the process of operation,Through model solving and numerical simulation,the influence of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and tenants on the evolution results is analyzed.The results show that during the construction process,the master-slave game of cost sharing realizes the Pareto improvement of the optimal benefits of both government and enterprises.However,there is an optimal value for cost sharing.As the proportion of sharing increases,the level of effort is gradually reduced,and the proportion of government sharing costs is too large,which will inhibit the developers' efforts.Collaborative cooperation game can maximize the system benefits,developers establish a reputation,increase the number of housing rentals,increase the developer's income,and then promote the construction of rental housing.In the course of operation,financial institutions and lessees have different evolutionary stability strategies under the five different levels of supervision;The participation of financial institutions in supervision can effectively reduce the government's regulatory costs and promote the government's evolution toward strict supervision;The tenant's participation in supervision can increase the probability of operator default exposure and promote its compliance,but the two do not function independently of each other.Only when the two are combined with common supervision will the system evolve to the optimal situation.Finally,relevant recommendations for the development of the concentrated commercial housing rental market.