Analysis On The Strategy Of Government Enterprise Cooperation Stability Of PPP Project Under The Guidance Of The Government

In recent years,PPP mode is a more cooperative mode adopted by the government and enterprises,by which the government can reduce the financial burden,improve the efficiency of infrastructure construction and the quality of operation service,while social capital can obtain project construction and reasonable investment return through different payment methods during the operation period.The PPP project contract Guide(Trial)issued by the Ministry of finance points out that the government and social capital are the main body of "equal legal status,equal rights and obligations".However,in the process of project implementation,the government is not only a cooperator,but also a supervisor.It is accustomed to the high management.Social capital often has the will to obtain the government's follow-up projects.Combined with the thought that the people do not fight with the officials for a long time in Chinese culture,the government occupies a dominant position,the decision-making discourse power is enhanced,too much intervention,and t he right space of social capital is squeezed.Evolutionary game theory first came into being in the field of biology.Later,it is more used to analyze cooperative behavior in economics.This paper analyzes the influence of government leadership on the sta bility strategy of PPP cooperation.First of all,this paper summarizes the evolution game theory and the research status of PPP project stability strategy by studying the relevant literature of PPP project at home and abroad,strategic alliance stability analysis and evolution game theory.The applicability of evolutionary game theory in the stability strategy of PPP project is analyzed,which lays the foundation for subsequent theoretical reasoning.Then,the evolutionary game model under the condition of equal status and government dominance is constructed respectively,and the cooperative stability strategies under the condition of equal status and government dominance are obtained,and the evolutionary characteristics of the two cases are further analyz ed through simulation.It is found that the optimal stability strategy(1,1)under the leadership of the government is missing compared with the stability strategy under the condition of equal status,and there is a circular game between the two sides.How ever,the comparison of evolution characteristics shows that the government leadership can accelerate the speed of the cooperation between the government and enterprises to reach the stability strategy.Finally,a case study of a rural complex PPP project is carried out to verify the strategic choice of government enterprise cooperation under the equal status and the government led situation,and to put forward suggestions to regulate the government led behavior.