Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Carbon Emission Reduction Of Government And Enterprise Driven By Multi Mechanism

Climate warming is a common challenge for all human beings.The extreme weather,ecological imbalance and other problems are profoundly affecting the process of human civilization.According to the international mainstream view,greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are the main cause of global warming.In the context of increasingly serious climate problems,it is difficult for countries in the world to be alone.Therefore,it is very important to formulate energy conservation and emission reduction policies according to the national conditions.As two key subjects,government and enterprises play an irreplaceable role in carbon emission reduction.As the main driving force of carbon emission reduction,the government should actively supervise and lead enterprises’ emission reduction behavior.Rational enterprises willingness identify the policy orientation and decide whether to carry out energy conservation and emission reduction according to the principle of maximizing their own profits.In turn,the behavior of enterprises will also affect the decision-making of the government.Because of the mutual influence and restriction between government and enterprise,it is very important to study the mechanism and influencing factors between them.Based on the theories of evolutionary game and nonlinear dynamic system,this paper establishes the basic model of evolutionary game for carbon emission reduction of government and enterprise,simulates the behavior paths of both parties in different situations,analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies of the two parties,and discusses the economic implications of the evolutionary stability results.It is concluded that without external constraints,the government and enterprises can not tend to the optimal state of carbon emission reduction.Through further research,we can find that the optimal conditions can be achieved by introducing the game between government and enterprise.In real life,the important role of public willingness in carbon emission reduction can not be ignored.The introduction of public willingness is closer to the reality,and will also help to improve the game results between government and enterprises.By introducing the constraint mechanism of public willingness,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government enterprise carbon emission reduction from the perspective of public willingness.The evolutionary stability strategies of both sides of the game are analyzed in detail by using system dynamics,and the behavior strategies of both sides of the game are numerically simulated and simulated in different situations.The results show that: under the constraint of the public willingness,there are four evolutionary stability strategies and a situation of fluctuating around the central point in the evolutionary game between government and enterprise.Whether the government enterprise game can reach the optimal state depends on the intensity of the constraint of the enterprise willingness on the government.The enhancement of the public willingness can further restrict the behavior of the government and enterprises,and reduce the lag of the two sides’ strategies;The initial intention of the government and enterprises willingness also have a certain impact on the path of carbon emission reduction.The initial intention of the government and enterprises willingness strengthen their own behavior,and in specific cases,it can also determine the final behavior strategy of the other party.In order to further optimize the path of carbon emission reduction,based on the constraint of public willingness,this paper continues to introduce carbon trading factors,and constructs the government enterprise evolutionary game model driven by carbon trading.Taking Hubei carbon trading market as an example,this paper visualizes the evolution path of government enterprise behavior,clarifies the possible state of government enterprise game in different stages of the development of Hubei carbon market,and puts forward corresponding strategies.The results show that: In the early stage of carbon market development,the government and enterprises willingness reach a game equilibrium(inaction,no carbon reduction)for their own interests.At this time,it is necessary to consider strengthening the enthusiasm of enterprises to take emission reduction measures in the short term,that is,to extend the "window period" of enterprise emission reduction;when the carbon market is in the growth stage,there are two uncertain situations,and measures should be taken to increase the proportion of(action,carbon reduction)cases;with the development of carbon market,there are two uncertain situations When the market is mature,both the government and the enterprise willingness spontaneously choose positive carbon emission reduction strategies,and finally reach the optimal state(action,carbon reduction).The role of initial willingness in the game between government and enterprises can not be ignored.Higher initial willingness of both parties is conducive to the improvement of carbon emission reduction status.