Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Government,enterprises And Consumers In The Post-subsidy Era Of New Energy Vehicles

Whether it is speeding up industrial transformation and upgrading,easing the pressure of ecological environment or solving the problem of energy shortage,the development of NEV industry is an effective way.Our country new energy automobile was listed in 2001 "863" plan key subsidized domain,and proposed "three vertical and three horizontal" research and development industrialization route.Since then,our country's new energy automobile enterprise mainly through the government subsidy,expands the domestic market as well as carries on the following innovation and so on means carries on the market competition.But in the face of high subsidies for some enterprises,there has been a phenomenon of fraud subsidies,new energy vehicle subsidy policy since 2017 gradually regressed into the "post-subsidy" era.The current financial subsidy environment has stabilized,and has passed the initial stage of state subsidies to support the new energy automotive industry.Therefore,the research of this paper can better reflect the effect of financial subsidies in the whole subsidy cycle,which has more reference significance for the further adjustment of national policy support in the field of new energy vehicles.The government's support policies are mainly concentrated in the production and sales links,with relatively few subsidies for the R&D link,resulting in insufficient R&D investment for new energy automobile companies,making core technology and product quality uncompetitive.Firstly,this paper simulates the reality of how to promote R&D innovation in the energy vehicle industry.Through the establishment of a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,automobile enterprises and consumers,the model is analyzed by using the replicated dynamic equation,and a stable equilibrium solution is obtained under the long-term condition that the government chooses not to support the NEV market,enterprises choose to invest in R&D of NEV and consumers choose to purchase NEV.On this basis,according to the numerical conditions of the equilibrium solution,the stability of the government,the car dealer and the consumer's selection strategy is verified by numerical simulation.Aiming at the problems of imperfect supporting infrastructure,difficult technological breakthroughs,and low consumer willingness to purchase in the current development of the new energy automobile industry,numerical simulation methods are used to focus on the analysis of government subsidies,enterprise R&D investment,and consumer utility.The role of variables in the evolutionary game model and the interaction mechanism among the three subjects.The analysis results show that under the background of the implementation of the subsidy policy,the research and development enthusiasm of new energy automobile companies and consumers' willingness to buy will be affected;the independent R&D investment of NEVs will be supported by the government,but the independent R&D investment of enterprises shall not exceed a certain limit,otherwise,the excessive price will affect the purchase willingness of consumers;the higher the utility of NEVs,the higher the willingness of consumers to purchase NEVs,the faster the government will cancel the market support policy,and the enterprises will invest more in the R&D of high-performance vehicles.Based on the background that the new energy vehicle industry is in the era of government post subsidy,this paper analyzes the evolutionary game among the government,enterprises and consumers,and obtains the decision-making trend of the three parties in the future.The purpose is to provide suggestions for the government to formulate reasonable policy support level and market guidance strategy,guide how to promote the expansion and stable development of new energy vehicle market in the next step,so as to promote the further adjustment and optimization of China's new energy vehicle industry policy,and provide reference for its further development.