Research On Contract Design Of Consumer Electronics Supply Chain Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

With the increasingly complicated international economic and trade situation,the problem of bilateral information asymmetry in the consumer electronics industry has also become more prominent.In order to maximize their own interests,each participating member in the supply chain is very likely to conceal or misrepresent private information that is detrimental to itself,and it is easy to cause frequent interruptions in the supply chain and ultimately lead to huge losses for the enterprise.This study is based on the above problems.The asymmetry of the information makes it easy for both parties to judge the authenticity of the received information,which leads to an increase in the decision-making costs of each other.Especially the information superiors cause the information disadvantaged people through some means after the transaction ends.Only then learned the truth of the information.Therefore,by reviewing the research status and development of information asymmetry and interruption at home and abroad,the paper summarizes the theoretical results of information asymmetry,supply chain interruption and supplier reliability management.It not only evaluates the reliability of suppliers under possible supply chain interruption It also discusses the impact of bilateral information symmetry on supply chain coordination.By constructing a two-tier supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two suppliers,a fault tree theoretical model is constructed,and the factors that affect the interruption of the supply chain are obtained using the Monte Carlo method.Finally,based on the assumption of bilateral information asymmetry and using contract mechanism design theory,the contract design problem under supply chain interruption risk was studied.The research shows that the secondary supply chain system dominated by private information has the possibility of interruption risk,and the main reason for its interruption is the supply and demand sides.By analyzing the interruption of the supply chain under the condition of bilateral information symmetry and mismatch,we have obtained Optimal contract model,and then through simulation: under the condition of symmetric information,the information advantages of manufacturers and suppliers are balanced,and the game cost is low;under the condition of bilateral information asymmetry,the game cost increases.When the information is asymmetric,the supplier of the dominant information leader may be more willing to actively provide backup production and obtain a higher information rent paid by the manufacturer,thereby causing the manufacturer to terminate cooperation with another supplier;At the time of business,within a certain cost range,suppliers are more willing to obtain information value with manufacturers through repurchase strategies and can share risks.The introduction of the information rent difference in the contract model proves that the value of information has a significant impact on the profit of the dominant party.By increasing the reliability factor of suppliers,it is possible to increase the ratio of supply volume and reduce the risk of supply disruption in the supply chain.