In recent years,rural public affairs governance has fallen into general depression.As an important part of rural public affairs governance in China,rural environmental pollution is not only directly related to the ecological livability of rural environment,but also related to the stability and development of rural areas.Rural environmental governance is not only an important part of rural public affairs,but also a weak link in rural public affairs governance,which has become a realistic bottleneck for the further promotion of rural revitalization strategy.Studying the causes and countermeasures of rural environmental pollution control has great theoretical and practical value for deepening the basic understanding of rural governance and promoting the reform of grassrootsThis study takes the factual case of pollution control of rural reservoir in Village D of Hebei Province as the window to observe the governance of rural public pond resources in China.Based on the analysis of the practical difficulties encountered in the governance of rural reservoir in this village,it focuses on exploring the possible mechanism behind it,and tries to restore the actual state of the current governance of rural public affairs in China.Based on collective action theory,public choice theory and collaborative governance theory,this study attempts to construct the analysis framework of ’payment ability-environmental governance willingness-collaborative governance ability ’ from three dimensions of feasible ability,interest and ethics,and analyzes the dilemma of subject cooperation in the practice of pollution control of rural reservoir.The study found that the reason why the case of rural reservoir pollution control is in trouble is caused by three reasons:First,it is difficult to achieve effective cooperation between the township government and rural residents.In the process of reservoir pollution control,the lack of trust between the government and the people leads to the loss of the initiative of the township government to integrate the rural relationship.Specifically,the cooperation between the local government and the ’ two committees ’ of the case village,the local government and the villagers of the case village fails.Second,it is difficult to achieve effective cooperation between township government and village enterprises.Village enterprises ignore the protection of the local environment for a long time due to the motivation of ’ self-interest ’.Township governments and local officials relax the regulation of pollution behavior of village enterprises due to the motivation of local economic priority development,acquiesce or even connivate the pollution behavior of village enterprises.Both of them show synergistic failure around the pollution control of rural agricultural storage tanks.Third,it is difficult to achieve effective cooperation among peasant groups.The transformation of the agricultural industrial structure in the case village has led to the rapid change of the social structure of the village,which has led to the sharp social differentiation and interest differentiation of the social class of the farmers in the village,resulting in the pollution of the reservoir.The ’ heterogeneity ’environmental governance intention is difficult to reach agreement between the atomized and alienated farmers.This study suggests that the collaborative failure between the local government and the rural residents,the collaborative failure between the local government and the enterprises in the village,and the collaborative failure between the internal groups of farmers lead to the failure of the pollution control of the rural reservoir.In this study,to clarify the types and characteristics of rural public pond resources,grasp the characteristics of the current rural village social structure change,foothold in how to improve and improve the efficiency of village governance,focusing on regulating the behavior of grass-roots government in national governance,is to promote rural public pond resources to achieve good governance. |