Research On Evolutionary Game Of Manufacturing Enterprise’s Cross-border Innovation

China’s demographic dividend is disappearing.The most significant advantage of Chinese manufacturing companies in the global industrial division of labor-low labor costs is also gradually losing.Only innovation can become the driving force for the sustainable development of China’s manufacturing industry.As my country’s economy enters the stage of transformation and development,most manufacturing companies that once relied on imitative innovation need to break through their lack of core technology and continuous innovation capabilities.Nowadays,cross-border innovation has become a trend,providing continuous vitality for the development of enterprises.In today’s increasingly important and prominent position of the manufacturing industry in international competition,studying the cross-border innovation of manufacturing enterprises has important theoretical and practical significance.Based on the analysis of the realistic background and theoretical literature,this paper firstly constructs an evolutionary game framework of a company-university research institute.The innovation of emerging technologies is inseparable from the cooperation between manufacturing enterprises and scientific research institutes of universities,and the problem of cross-border innovation of manufacturing enterprises has been studied from the micro level.By expounding the conflict of interest between manufacturing enterprises and university research institutes in cross-border innovation cooperation,an evolutionary game model is established,the stability of evolution is analyzed,and the dynamic evolution process of the system is discussed.Based on the simulation method,the theoretical results are verified,and the influence of key parameters on the evolution path is analyzed.Furthermore,two multi-agent evolutionary game models composed of enterprises and governments for cross-border innovation cooperation were established,and the evolutionary stability strategies of the tripartite evolutionary game in various situations were proposed,and the possible influence strategies were studied through simulation analysis.The key factor of choice.The main innovative conclusions of this article include:One is to study the situation of collaborative cross-border innovation cooperation between manufacturing enterprises and university scientific research institutions.Through the establishment of an evolutionary game model,the discussion and research found that the collaborative innovation level of manufacturing enterprises has little effect on the strategic choices of universities and scientific research institutes.Regardless of the manufacturing company’s strategy,the choice of universities and research institutions can benefit the most from high-level collaboration strategies.The second is to analyze the three-party game relationship between the two companies that carry out cross-border innovation cooperation and the government.Through model solving and data simulation analysis,it is found that achieving more innovative value-added is the basis for cooperation between all companies and determining reasonable profits The distribution ratio is the key to facilitating the possibility of cross-industry cooperative innovation in different industries.At the same time,the government’s direct investment incentives can promote cross-border collaboration and innovation among enterprises in the short term.