The Mechanism And Effect Evaluation Of Multi-agent Participation In Air Pollution Control

Since China’s reform and opening up,the country’s economy has experienced tremendous growth.However,the low-quality economic expansion,which is defined by high consumption and pollution,has led to severe air pollution,adversely impacting people’s life and development of social economy.It has been widely concerned by the society.Recently,China has introduced a series of effective measures to control air pollution.However,air pollution control is a complex project with many interest subjects,so it is necessary to analyze the interest demand and responsibilities of each participating subject systematically,and to explore the function mechanism and effect of multi-subject participation of air pollution control.Taking into account the interests and demands of each participating party,this paper analyzes the mechanism of multi-agent participation in atmospheric pollution control based on the evolutionary game theory model.By utilizing the statistical data of SO₂,PM₁₀ and NO_x,three important air pollutants in various provinces since 2011-2019,this study makes an empirical analysis of the impact and mechanism of air pollution control under the multi-party participation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.The policy suggestions have been proposed to promote the effect of collaborative governance of air pollution and green development.Firstly,this paper analyzes the Chinese situation of air pollution and the multi-party participation in pollution control by comparison.The results show that air pollution is decreasing year by year.The total emission of SO₂,PM₁₀ and NO_x all decrease,among which SO₂ pollution control effect is remarkable.Government regulation,technological innovation and public participation can effectively control air pollution.Secondly,under the assumption of bounded rationality,the evolutionary game model of"government-enterprise"and"public-enterprise"is constructed.The cost of participants is divided into three levels:high,middle and low.The scenario simulation is carried out to analyze the environmental behavior choices of participants under different costs.The results show that the behavior choice of each participant is related to the net income obtained in the process of environmental governance.When the cost is low,each participant chooses the positive environmental governance behavior.With the increase of cost,all parties tend to the negative environmental governance behavior.Thirdly,considering the limited environmental governance effect of two-party,the third party is introduced to construct the"government-enterprise-public"tripartite evolutionary game model.The strategy evolution process and influencing factors are analyzed.The results show that when the system meets certain requirements,the ideal state of government,enterprise and public participating in air pollution governance can be achieved.The simulation results show that the economic income and the reduction coefficient of environmental protection tax in the case of enterprise positive governance,the environmental protection tax and administrative punishment in the case of negative governance,the reputational loss of enterprise and government,and the mental health benefits in the case of public supervision will promote the system to reach a stable state as soon as possible.The reduction of government supervision cost,enterprise governance cost,public supervision cost,government subsidy,economic income of enterprises in negative governance and environmental protection tax paid in active governance will promote the system to reach a stable state as soon as possible.Finally,using the data of Chinese provinces from 2011 to 2019,the fixed effect model and the intermediary effect model are constructed to empirically analyze the direct and indirect impacts of government regulation and public participation on air pollution emissions,and the threshold effect model is used to test the moderating effect of public participation.The results show that both the government regulation and public participation have a direct and indirect inhibition effects on air pollution emissions,the technological innovation plays a partial intermediary role.There is a single threshold effect on government regulation for air pollution emissions.When public participation crosses the threshold,the inhibitory effect of government regulation on air pollution is strengthened.This paper consists of 31 figures,31 tables and 136 references.