Game Analysis Of Industrial Pollution Regulation Evolution Under The Double Carbon Background

As China’s rapid industrialization continues to develop,the process of industrial production will generate and discharge a large amount of waste water,waste gas and waste residue in the process of strong resource and energy demand,especially strong toxic,poisonous and harmful industrial pollutants,etc.,which will bring serious damage to the ecological environment.Although China has paid much attention to sustainable development,it has not paid enough attention to the management of industrial pollution,and the efficiency of industrial pollution regulation in China today is much lower than that of developed countries and regions in the West."Dual carbon" is an important strategic decision made by China in promoting the responsibility of building a community with a shared future for mankind and in the process of sustainable development.It highlights China’s new efforts and new contributions in tackling global climate change and builds up renewed confidence and hope for tackling global climate change in the future.It also shows that China will continue to follow the path of green and low-carbon development and promote the development of all mankind.Regulating industrial pollution is part of the effort to reach the two-carbon goal.But the regulation of industrial pollution is a very complex matter,involving the interests of the government,enterprises and the public.In the current situation,it is urgent to improve the supervision and management system of industrial pollution,but it is not clear what the norms and the basis of measurement are for the supervision and management of industrial pollution by our government.In the current context of relatively lagging development of industrial pollution supervision,how to make full use of the relevant national policies in order to achieve effective supervision of industrial pollution has become an urgent problem.To this end,this paper begins with the establishment of an evolutionary game model between the various stakeholders,and conducts a study on each stakeholder to provide reference for the government’s scientific decision-making.At present,scholars at home and abroad have carried out a lot of practical research and gained a lot of pollution control experience from governments.The industrial environment of various countries has also been greatly improved,but there are still many problems that have not been solved and the problem of industrial pollution is still serious.To solve the problem of industrial pollution is still an important step for countries to steadily develop on the road of sustainable development.Therefore,this paper summarizes and summarizes the problems of industrial government pollution control at home and abroad,and innovates the research methods of industrial pollution control.Firstly,this paper introduces the theories related to the status of industrial pollution regulation and the current situation at home and abroad.Secondly,based on the current industrial development and problems in China,two major stakeholders,the government and enterprises,are selected to construct an evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises regarding industrial pollution regulation,and Vensim is used to theoretically investigate.Then,the shortcomings of public participation in regulation in the current situation,the causes of the problem and the need for it are explained.On the basis of the above,the public is added to the system of industrial pollution regulation,and an evolutionary game model between the public,the government and the enterprises in the regulation of industrial pollution is established.Finally,the analysis of the game results shows that public participation is an essential tool in the current environmental protection.According to the above research results,this paper puts forward some specific suggestions and puts forward some practical countermeasures on how to promote the development of industry.The research results show that if public participation in regulation is to be introduced,enterprises will choose to actively control pollution in order to achieve the ultimate goal of low cost but high efficiency under the circumstance that the government does not supervise but the public will supervise.The main concern of the government is the general interests of the society.In social life,the public pursues their own interests.When an enterprise has a negative impact on the social environment,it has touched the vital interests of the public,and the public will certainly choose to regulate it,but they may not be enthusiastic enough.To make industrial pollution more effective control.However,enterprises are concerned about their immediate interests.Although not actively polluting will cause adverse consequences to the social ecology,enterprises will still adopt strategies with higher profits.With the participation of the public in supervision,enterprises will take the comprehensive benefits into consideration and choose to actively control pollution,so as to achieve the purpose of efficient pollution control and reduce the impact on the environment and public life.