Research On The Evolutionary Game Strategy Of Government And Enterprise From The Perspective Of China’s Foreign Direct Investment

“Since the 19 th National Congress”,the rise of international protectionism and counter-globalisation,international trade frictions and the global outbreak of the 2020 new crown epidemic have worsened the international investment market environment and increased the risks for enterprises participating in OFDI.The Chinese government and enterprises need to adjust their OFDI strategy sets to better cope with the changing and complex international investment market.The contradiction and cooperation between the government and enterprises in their business objectives and the information asymmetry between the government and enterprises have led to the compatibility of incentives between the government and enterprises,thus driving China’s OFDI into a phase of rapid growth in value and improvement in quality.When government and enterprises are in an unbalanced state in OFDI,government and enterprise efficiency decreases and hinders the evolution of Chinese OFDI to higher quality.At the same time,there will be an uneven distribution of international investment,increased risks for enterprises to participate in OFDI,and weakened confidence of enterprises in OFDI,which is not conducive to China’s economic development towards higher quality.The post-epidemic volatility in the international investment market has once again upset the dynamic equilibrium of the evolutionary game between the Chinese government and enterprises under OFDI.Therefore,this paper explores the trend of the evolutionary game between government and enterprises in improving the quality and efficiency of Chinese OFDI by building an evolutionary game model between government and enterprises,combining literature analysis and data simulation experiments to find the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game between government and enterprises in the new domestic and international environment.The development of China’s opening up to the outside world towards higher quality requires that Chinese OFDI also evolves towards higher quality and higher efficiency.By analysing the evolutionary game between government and enterprises in OFDI,we find that the process of government and enterprises promoting quality and efficiency in Chinese OFDI is the process of finding the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game between government and enterprises at different stages.Therefore,this paper classifies the government’s behaviour into "service" and "institutional",and the enterprises’ behaviour into"strong participation" and "weak participation"."This paper classifies government behaviour as ’service’ and ’institutional’ and corporate behaviour as ’strong participation’ and ’weak participation’.The evolutionary game model of government and enterprises in OFDI is constructed based on the payoffs of both sides of the game under different sets of strategy choices,and the equilibrium solutions of both sides of the game are obtained by calculating the replicated dynamic equations.Data simulation experiments are conducted on the evolutionary game model of government and enterprises in this thesis in conjunction with actual data,so as to improve the rationality of the evolutionary game model and derive the equilibrium solutions of the strategies of government and enterprises in OFDI.By establishing an evolutionary game model and data simulation experiments,this paper concludes that in the new environment of OFDI,the equilibrium solution of evolutionary game between government and enterprises is(1,1),that is,government strategy prefers "service-oriented strategy" and enterprise strategy prefers "strong participation strategy".On the one hand,the Chinese government should increase the feedback methods on enterprises’ OFDI behavior,so as to reduce the information asymmetry between government and enterprises.On the other hand,the government should strengthen the construction of economic and trade cooperation and improve the market activity of OFDI.On the one hand,enterprises should make rational use of government resources and optimize the structure and mode of OFDI.On the other hand,to improve the core competitiveness of enterprises and promote the compatibility of incentives between government and enterprises.In the evolutionary game,the government and enterprises constantly promote the evolution of international investment to high efficiency,so as to realize the evolution of China’s OFDI to high quality.