Research On The Equilibrium Condition Of The Collusion Game Between Tenderee And Bidder In Government Investment Project

In government investment project,collusion behavior between tenderer and bidder often occurs,which not only destroys the good order of the competitive market,but also damages the interests of the state and society.How to prevent the tenderer and bidder conspiring is an important subject in the process of government investment project bidding;This paper will take the government investment project as the research object,and will carry out the research on the condition of collusion game equilibrium between the tenderee and the bidder aiming to provide practical and effective suggestions for the government to prevent collusion.First of all,this paper comprehensively analyzes and summarizes the research status of bidding collusion at home and abroad,and expounds the connotation of government investment project,collusion between tenderer and bidder,etc.,which provides a basis for the analysis of the equilibrium conditions of collusion game between tenderee and bidder of government investment project in the future.Secondly,on the premise of considering the influence of psychological factors on the decision-maker's perceived value and decision weight,the static game model of the tenderer and the bidder in the case of single bidding is constructed based on the prospect theory,and the static game equilibrium condition that makes the tenderer and the bidder reach the state of non-collusion is obtained.Through in-depth analysis to the static game equilibrium conditions,it can be seen that the possibility of non-collusion of bidder can be improved by the way of reducing the rent paid by bidder,reducing the extra income obtained by bidder's collusion and increasing the prospect value of the colluded tenderer.Thirdly,the dynamic evolutionary game model of the tenderer and the bidder in the case of repeated bidding is constructed based on the prospect theory,and the benefit matrix of psychological factors and the replicative dynamic equation are formed.By solving the equation,the dynamic game equilibrium condition that promotes the tenderer and the bidder to be stable in the state of non-collusion is obtained.By using Python language to carry out numerical simulation analysis on the parameters in the equilibrium condition,it can be found that the additional income obtained by the bidder collusion is reduced,the loss aversion coefficient is increased,etc.,which can have a great impact on the strategy of both sides of the game and promote the tenderer and bidder to stabilize in the state of non-collusion.In the end,on the basis of combing the theoretical analysis conclusion and combining with the actual situation of relevant laws,policies and market environment of government investnent project bidding,the measures and suggestions to prevent collusion between bidder and tenderer are proposed,including identifying loss aversion coeflficient,optimizing market environment,improving supervision efficiency of supervision institutions,reducing profit seeking space for bidders,and improving the willingness of tenderer and bidder to report collusion.Based on modeling and solving the model of a single bidding situation,repeated bidding situation and bidder collusion game and equilibrium conditions,this paper got the equilibrium condition that tenderer and the bidder are not in collusion state,the reasearch not only has certain theoretical and practical value,but also provides certain reference for the government to precaution longitudinal collusion in the process of tendering and bidding of government investment project.