Study On The Influence Of Multiple Cogovernance Entities On The Environmental Behavior Of High Pollution Enterprises Under The Third-party International Environmental Audit

China’s economy is no longer in the stage of high-speed growth,and then to the stage of high-quality development.However,in the process of China’s rapid economic development,resource shortage and environmental pollution problems are increasingly serious,which can not be ignored.The current government still needs to solve the problem of how to carry out environmental governance more efficiently.A better ecological environment has become people’s rigid demand for a better life.We need to promote sound interaction between the government,the public and financial institutions in environmental governance.To ensure the protection of the ecological environment while maintaining the steady economic development and explore the multi-governance of environmental governance is an important research topic of great significance to the sustainable development of China.Enterprises as the main body of economic activities are the main source of pollution,the government as the main restriction and supervision of environmental governance,the public as an important participant of environmental governance,and financial institutions as the main fund for polluting enterprises.The behavior and decision-making of all parties are restricted by many factors.At present,the effectiveness of collaborative environmental governance still needs to be improved.Information asymmetry often exists in the multi-party game of environmental governance,and relevant studies prove that third-party international environmental audit can effectively reduce the adverse effects of this problem.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study the influence and existing problems of government environmental regulation,public participation and financial institution credit on environmental behavior of high-pollution enterprises under third-party international environmental audit.This paper explores the impact of government regulation,public participation and financial institution credit on the environmental behavior of high-polluting enterprises from the perspective of evolutionary game.An evolutionary game model of the government,the public,financial institutions and highly polluting enterprises under third-party international environmental audit is constructed.The stability of the policy choices of each game player is analyzed according to the quadripartite return matrix,and the stability of the equilibrium points in the quadripartite game system of corporate environmental behavior is analyzed based on Lyapunov’s First rule.Study and analyze the behavioral characteristics and interlaced interest relations of the four parties in the process of environmental governance,discuss the effectiveness of green credit,government regulation and public participation in promoting the positive environmental behavior of high-pollution enterprises and the existing problems,and finally conduct simulation through MATLAB software.The paper analyzes the influence of key factors on the evolution of game subjects,such as the cost of strict government supervision,the punishment of enterprises for pollution,the punishment of the government by the superior,the amount of reward,the intensity of subsidy,the hidden income of enterprises,and the cost of investigation by financial institutions on enterprises.Finally,the game model and its simulation results are analyzed and discussed.Starting from the government,enterprises,the public and financial institutions,suggestions were put forward to promote environmental pollution control by high-polluting enterprises,which expands the application scope of third-party international environmental audit and enrichis the content of promoting environmental control by high-polluting enterprises.