Research On The Influence Mechanism Of Enterprises Green Technology Innovation In Chinese Environmental Governance System ——Based On The Evolutionary Game Theory

Since the 1970 s,China’s economy has developed rapidly due to reform and opening-up,but the extensive economic growth mode has brought a series of serious environmental problems.In the 21 st century,with the improvement of public awareness of environmental protection and the demand for high-quality ecological environment,the central government began to attach importance to environmental protection.The government has increased the intensity of environmental regulations since 2011 to protect the environment.It is concluded that,under certain environmental regulation,the development of pollution enterprises is hindered by the increase of environmental compliance cost,and the environmental protection enterprises are developing rapidly because of the policy guidance.This series of environmental protection policies,so that China’s environmental problems have been effectively improved at the same time,China’s high-speed economic growth has slowed down,which we do not want to see.In order to maintain the healthy growth of China’s economy and the sound and sustainable development of its environmental governance system,polluting enterprises need to carry out independent green technology innovation to overcome the cost problems brought about by environmental regulation,the environmental protection enterprise also needs to carry on the technical innovation under the good policy situation in order to speed up the industry the benign development.Therefore,it is a difficult problem to seek to promote the green technology innovation of polluting enterprises and environmental protection enterprises at the same time.The environmental governance system includes three main bodies:Environmental Protection Enterprises,pollution enterprises and the government.Among them,the pollution enterprises are the responsible parties of environmental governance,and the Environmental Protection Enterprises are the service parties of environmental governance,and they also serve the pollution enterprises and the government,the government is the supervisor of environmental management.Firstly,this paper sorts out the relevant theories of environmental governance and analyzes the changing trend of China’s environmental governance system,so as to get the theoretical framework of environmental governance system and the influence mechanism of each subject.Then,from the perspective of dynamic analysis,a threeparty evolutionary game model of environmental governance system is constructed based on the Evolutionary Game Theory,in which the environmental protection enterprises,the polluting enterprises and the government are the main players,the factors that influence the technological innovation of environmental protection enterprises and the green technological innovation of pollution enterprises in the environmental governance system are obtained.This paper further uses Matlab software to simulate the evolution of the important influence factors of environmental governance system to observe the evolution trend of each subject,so as to analyze the sensitivity of different subject to the important influence factors,in order to explore the influence of the change of the important factors in different periods on the evolution result,the data simulation of the evolution stable strategy of changing the initial population proportion of each subject was carried out.The results show that the intensity of environmental regulation and the increase of government green innovation subsidy can promote green technology innovation of environmental enterprises and polluting enterprises,while the degree of “Freerider”subsidy given by polluting enterprises to environmental enterprises is different As a result of the evolution of the system,there is a situation that only changing the “Free rider”subsidy level can promote the green technology innovation of two kinds of enterprises without increasing the intensity of environmental regulation.At the same time,through the scenario analysis,it is found that the different initial states of the agents in the evolutionary system will also affect the evolutionary results of the system.Therefore,to change the strategy of the subject with higher initial intention needs higher requirement.This paper analyzes the sensitivity of each factor and finds that the main body is most sensitive to the change of the intensity of environmental regulation,and the Government’s innovation subsidy is next,the “Free-rider ” subsidy can only affect the behavior strategy of environmental enterprises and polluters.The positive externalities of environmental enterprises to polluters have little effect on the system.Through the analysis of the evolution process,it is also found that the change of the intensity of environmental regulation makes the government reach the evolutional stable state first,then the pollution enterprises,and finally the environmental protection enterprises reach the evolutional stable state,this also shows that environmental regulation directly affects the polluting enterprises,through changing the behavior of polluting enterprises can indirectly affect the behavior of environmental protection enterprises.