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Analysis Of Product Quality Information Disclosure In Supply Chain Under Dual Retailer Model

Posted on:2022-09-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H X WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306560974589Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In order to study the problem of information disclosure strategy in supply chain,this paper establishes a duopoly retailer supply chain system including one manufacturer and two retailers,and introduces the Stackelberg model and the Cournot model.The manufacturer and the retailer form Stackelberg competition,and the retailers make decisions in two competitive modes,respectively.The inverse method and matlab simulation are used to analyze.There are three kinds of information disclosure decisions :(1)Manufacturers directly disclose product quality information.(2)Manufacturers do not disclose information.(3)Manufacturers and retailers jointly disclose product quality information and jointly share disclosure costs.Firstly,this paper studies the optimal disclosure strategy of enterprises and the relationship between various factors such as disclosure cost,disclosure ratio,pricing,order quantity and wholesale price,and compares and analyzes the disclosure strategies of different competitive modes.The study finds that :(1)When the product quality can exceed a certain threshold,enterprises will choose to disclose product quality information.(2)When retailers bear a high proportion of disclosure costs,the Cournot competition model is more likely to disclose product quality information.When manufacturers bear a high proportion of disclosure costs,the Starberg competition model is easier to disclose product quality information.(3)When manufacturers discount wholesale prices to encourage retailers to disclose information,the price of products may decrease with the increase of the total cost of disclosure.(4)For manufacturers,when the disclosure cost is high,manufacturers are more willing to directly disclose all product quality information.When the disclosure cost is low,manufacturers are more willing to let retailers bear all the disclosure costs.In the Starberg competition model,manufacturers are more willing to share disclosure costs with retailers in a certain range of disclosure costs.(5)For retailers,joint disclosure with manufacturers is more advantageous than direct disclosure with manufacturers when disclosure costs are high.(6)In the whole supply chain,when the disclosure cost is low,retailers bear all the disclosure cost is the most favorable.When the disclosure cost is high,the manufacturer bears all the disclosure costs most favorable.The research in this paper can provide effective theoretical support for enterprises ' information disclosure strategy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Stackelberg Competition, Cournot Competition, Supply Chain, Information Disclosure, Game Theory
PDF Full Text Request
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