Research On Technology Licensing Strategy Of Innovative Manufacturers In A Competitive Environment

With the development of the knowledge economy and economic globalization,technology licensing has become the main way for innovative companies to improve their competitive advantage.As the core content of corporate patent strategy,licensing has received extensive attention in both theoretical and practical fields.By constructing different supply chain models,this paper studies the technology licensing of internal and external innovative companies and the supply chain encroachment combined with licensing.Firstly,for the general innovative manufacturers,we constructed a multiple oligarchy competition structure to discuss the technology licensing under the Cournot and the Stackelberg game model.We find that under both game models,innovative manufacturers are always willing to license their patented technology to third-party potential entrants,and compared with the Cournot competition structure of simultaneous decision-making,if the product substitution coefficient is relatively small,innovative manufacturers prefer to Stackelberg competition and make the decision later.This conclusion can provide powerful management inspiration for small and medium-sized technological innovation enterprises.Then,for the internal innovative manufacturers who have the technology to reduce production costs,we discuss the selections of innovative manufacturers' licensing strategy in consideration of product competition and technology spillover effects,and gives the conditions where innovative manufacturers willing license its technology under each strategy.Compared with three different licensing strategies,when the degree of technology spillover is low,the mixed licensing fee is better than the royalty and fixed fee;when the degree of technology spillover is high,the mixed licensing fee is equivalent to royalty licensing fee and is better than the fixed fee strategy.Different from previous research conclusions,we find that due to the existence of technology spillover effects,licensing can always improve social welfare under the three strategies,and under the fixed fee licensing,the social welfare level reaches the highest.Finally,for the external innovative manufacturers who have the technology to improve product quality,we discuss the selections of innovative manufacturers' licensing and invasion strategies in consideration of the service efficiency of incumbent manufacturers and consumer quality preferences.We found that license simultaneous encroachment strategy is always more favorable than only encroachment;compared to only license and license simultaneous encroachment,the service efficiency of incumbent manufacturers and consumers quality preferences are high at the same time,the optimal strategy for external innovative manufacturers is only license.In other cases,license simultaneous encroachment is always the optimal strategy.And unlike the only encroachment strategy,which only harms the profit of the incumbent manufacturer,there is a Pareto improvement area under the only license and license simultaneous encroachment strategy.In this area,the encroaching and licensing behavior of external innovative manufacturers will increase the incumbent and external innovative manufacturers at the same time and achieve a win-win situation.The research in this paper combines the actual situation and fully considers the effects of different game models,product competition,technology spillover effects,service efficiency,and consumer quality preferences.It has certain reference value for internal and external innovative manufacturers to choose optimal licensing and encroaching strategies?...