Game Analysis And Decision Research Of Remanufacturing Supply Chain System For Information And Communication Equipment

Since entering the era of the Internet,mobile Internet,and industrial Internet,information and communications technologies have brought dramatic changes to people’s production and life.Meanwhile,people have to face numerous waste information and communication equipment(WICE),which may be wastes of polluting the environment or "urban mines".Therefore,many countries around the world have enacted relevant laws and regulations to force producers to collect and dispose of WICE.Remanufacturing is a common way to deal with WICE.As of January 1,2020,the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has released eight remanufactured product catalogs.It has been selected that increasing remanufactured products of information and communication equipment.This dissertation first examines the management policies and practices of WICE in European countries,the U.S.,Japan,and China,and their recovery characteristics are well captured.Afterward,this dissertation studies the recovery schemes and pricing decisions of European countries with multi-level competition and multi-factor influence by building Stackelberg game models.This dissertation investigates the pricing decisions and collection strategies based on retailers’collection and ordering competition through the establishment of Cournot game models and Stackelberg game models,which are applied to the case of HP ink cartridges in the U.S.This dissertation also examines the collection strategies and incentive mechanisms based on "Internet plus collection" in China by building an evolutionary game model of coopetition.At first,this dissertation summarizes the management policies and collection practices of European countries,the U.S.,Japan,and China,describes their recovery characteristics of WICE,and proposes seven policy suggestions on the recovery of WICE based on lessons learned from developed countries and the current situation of recovery in China.The results show that:(1)European countries,the U.S.(most states),Japan,and China have adopted the Extended Producer Responsibility,which forces producers to be responsible for or support the recovery of WICE;(2)European countries have established an efficient and perfect WICE recovery management system,combining responsibility-oriented recovery and market-oriented treatment;(3)in the U.S.,WICE is collected by drop-offs in the stores,like retail stores,direct-sale stores,operator stores,and by post;(4)in Japan,the recovery of WICE in Japan needs to be authorized,and the privacy protection mode should be added;(5)nowadays,the formal mode of "Internet plus collection" has gradually become the main collection channel of WICE in China.Secondly,the European countries’ recovery schemes and pricing decisions are examined under the multi-level competition and the influence of multi-factor.Specifically,this dissertation,aiming at the recovery schemes for European countries,proposes the competition between two manufacturers and two recyclers at the upper and lower levels and the same level.This dissertation also analyzes the effects of characteristic factors,such as sales and recovery competition,economies of scale of the recovery,collection rate,and remanufacturing rate,on the recovery schemes and pricing decisions in the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain(RCLSC).The results show that:(1)under certain conditions,the competitive recovery scheme is more beneficial to all participants than the monopolistic recovery scheme,that is,consumers,recyclers,and manufacturers can achieve a win-win situation by choosing the competitive recovery scheme;(2)in the monopolistic recovery scheme,there is an unfair "free-rider" phenomenon:the enhancement of the recycler’s competitiveness will increase the recovery volume of WICE but reduce her charge and profit;(3)the increase of the market competitiveness will increase the selling prices of the manufacturers’ products and the recycling fees of WICE;(4)the increase of the economies of scale and the collection rate will reduce the selling prices and the recycling fees;(5)the increase of the remanufacturing rate will reduce the selling prices and increase the recycling fees;(6)the market competitiveness,the collection rate,and the revocery competitiveness have a greater impact on the recycling fee than other factors;the market competitiveness has the greatest impact on the selling price and the equilibrium profits of the recyclers and manufacturers.Thirdly,the dynamic coupling relationship of RCLSC based on the retailers’collection and ordering competition is studied.To be specific,this dissertation investigates the dynamic coupling relationship between the manufacturer’s wholesale and transfer pricing decisions and two retailers’ ordering and collection strategies,considering the collection and ordering competition between two retailers.This dissertation also discusses for the first time the manufacturer’s profit,sales performance,and collection effect and the retailers’ profits,order quantity,and collection efforts under various optimal pricing.The results show that:(1)under low pricing,retailers prefer to take collection;under moderate pricing,taking and not taking collection coexist,and the equilibrium probability for choosing collection depends on the unit transfer price and return reward;under high pricing,retailers neither collect nor do business;(2)the market demand of the retailer choosing collection is positively correlated with his collection effort;the market demand of the retailer not taking collection is negatively correlated with the collection effort of the rival who takes collection;(3)under low pricing,the unit return reward is paid by the manufacturer at the transfer price,not by retailers,which results that only the manufacturer’s profit is slightly affected by the increase in the reward;however,under moderate pricing,this reward is extremely detrimental to place orders and undertake collection;(4)no matter under low or moderate pricing,reducing the wholesale price is the best way to cope with increased manufacturing costs;(5)from the perspective of profits,the manufacturer and retailer both tend to choose low pricing strategy to obtain higher profits;from the perspective of collected quantity of waste products,the manufacturer should implement moderate pricing strategy to obtain more orders and collected quantity.Finally,the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM)of RCLSC for the "Internet plus collection" is investigated.Specifically,this dissertation focuses on the collection between the manufacturer and the online collector and discusses their competition and cooperation as well as evolution trends in the "Internet plus collection".For the first time,this dissertation examines the bilateral RPM based on the dynamic equilibrium of competition and cooperation evolution under the equal reverse supply chain structure.It is found that:(1)bilateral cooperation is the most beneficial for the manufacturer and the online collector;after that,the manufacturer obtains more remanufactured raw materials,and the online collector obtains more collection incomes;(2)due to the manufacturer’s or online collector’s breach of contract,unreasonable RPMs,or insufficient operation capabilities,they will be in the situation where cooperation and competition alternate in the long run;(3)a bilateral internal RPM can be established to promote their evolution towards the trend of cooperation when they are in an unstable state;(4)the manufacturer should carefully evaluate the performance history and operation capability of the online collector before adopting the cooperation strategy;once the cooperation is reached,he should faithfully perform;(5)the online collector should improve the operation management capability to enhance the manufacturer’s willingness to bear the opportunity cost of cooperation,increase the quantity and quality of collection to improve the probability of service success,and make full use of the manufacturer’s resources,like using the manufacturer’s sales outlets to collect WICE,to reduce his switching cost of cooperation.To sum up,this research enriches the theoretical research,including the game model with multi-level competition and multi-factor influence in the RCLSC,the dynamic coupling relationship between the ordering of new products and the collection of WICE in the RCLSC,and the incentive mechanism of the remanufacturing reverse supply chain.This research also has some practical significance.It provides several policy recommendations for the recovery of WICE in China.Decision support is provided for members in the RCLSC under the retailer’s collection channel.In addition,it offers an incentive mechanism for the new remanufacturing reverse supply chain structure of the "Internet plus collection".