Game Models For Government Incented E-commerce Participating In Poverty Alleviation

E-commerce for poverty alleviation is an important means to effectively promote targeted poverty alleviation,and it is also the fundamental guarantee for promoting rural economic development.At present,due to the vast rural areas in China,the long leading time for policy implementation,and imperfect system design,e-commerce poverty alleviation work is still in its infancy,and there are many problems,such as the lack of responsibilities of government departments,and the lack of participation in ecommerce platforms Low level,restricting the effective advancement of e-commerce poverty alleviation work.Therefore,government departments must formulate effective incentive strategies for e-commerce platforms in order to improve the subjective motivation of e-commerce platforms to participate in poverty alleviation and ensure the effectiveness of e-commerce poverty alleviation work.In order to explore in depth how government departments can effectively motivate e-commerce platforms in ecommerce poverty alleviation,this dissertation uses evolutionary game model and principal-agent model as the main theoretical tools to construct a dynamic evolutionary game model and principal-agent "government department-e-commerce platform" under bounded rationality Incentive model,through model solving and MATLAB simulation,analyze the influence mechanism of government incentive strategy on the behavior selection of e-commerce platform.Evolutionary game analysis shows that:(1)The strategy evolution of both parties is dynamic and periodic.When the value interval of key parameters changes,the system will tend to four evolutionary stable results and a specific periodic pattern;(2)Cycle In the mode,the direction of convergence largely depends on the initial state of the system,but the evolution direction can be changed by adjusting the marginal supervision cost,incentive intensity,consumer preference and other parameters,so that the system converges to a better evolutionary stable result;(3)Government economic incentives are an effective way to promote e-commerce platforms to actively participate in poverty alleviation.However,a substantial increase in economic incentives will increase financial pressure.It can be combined with effective administrative supervision and punishment and restraint mechanisms to guide e-commerce platforms to actively participate in poverty alleviation.Principal-agent analysis shows that:(1)E-commerce platform effort level is negatively related to its marginal effort cost,and positively related to the output coefficient,that is,when the e-commerce platform increases the unit effort level,the lower the input cost,the greater the performance output.,The e-commerce platform is more motivated to participate in poverty alleviation;(2)Incentive intensity is a decreasing function of the marginal effort cost and risk aversion coefficient of the ecommerce platform,and an increasing function of the output coefficient;(3)As the marginal supervision cost increases,The government's willingness to supervise ecommerce platforms continues to decrease,and the intensity of supervision continues to diminish.With the increase of consumer preferences,the government's supervision of e-commerce platforms has increased,showing a positive correlation.Based on the above conclusions,combined with practice,a corresponding strategy for motivating e-commerce platforms to participate in e-commerce poverty alleviation has been formulated.From the perspective of government departments,e-commerce platforms,consumers and other subjects,it has analyzed how to effectively play the role of incentives and can help my country's e-commerce poverty alleviation work.The orderly and effective development of the project provides a practical and feasible strategy reference.