Analysis Of Game Relationship Among The Participating Parties Of Industrial Poverty Alleviation Under Different Government Support Systems

Since entering the new era of economic development,the state has further increased poverty alleviation work.Under the poverty alleviation mode of enterprises and farmers,many enterprises have actively participated in industrial poverty alleviation and achieved certain results.Industrial poverty alleviation has become an important measure of the national antipoverty strategy.The so-called industrial poverty alleviation is mainly based on the natural conditions of the poverty-stricken areas and the current situation of economic development.The government supports the poor farmers to develop local characteristic industries through local policies and funds,and promotes local poverty alleviation through industrial development.The development of industry under the market economy system must conform to the laws of the market.However,due to the characteristics of agriculture itself,the poverty alleviation industry is currently developing under the leadership of the government,which is contrary to the market law.The law of the market plays a vital role in the development of the industry.In the industrial poverty alleviation,the local government should actively change its own functions.It is no longer just a regulatory relationship with the poverty alleviation enterprises,but should establish a relationship model of cooperation and supervision.Therefore,the study of the game relationship between the two will contribute to the sustainable development of industrial poverty alleviation.Firstly,based on the industrial poverty alleviation model and using evolutionary game theory,this paper establishes a replication dynamic equation to analyze the dynamic evolution process of the strategy choice of local governments and poverty alleviation enterprises under supervision,and obtains the evolutionary stability strategy of both sides of the game.The conclusion shows that the choice of local government poverty alleviation methods,the punishment for illegal operations and the success rate of supervision directly affect the sustainable development of industrial poverty alleviation;secondly,establish a tripartite game model of local governments,poverty alleviation enterprises and farmers in industrial poverty alleviation,and analyze the optimal strategies of each participant under different initial conditions and the benefits under different combination of strategies,the conclusion shows that the current industrial poverty alleviation is limited by local agricultural development,corporate attitudes and development awareness of poor farmers.The government cannot fully marketed the poverty alleviation industry and must participate in supervision and Regulation and control.Finally put forward specific proposals on the issue of sustainable development of industrial poverty alleviation.