| With the continuous advancement of the wave of economic globalization,the development of global networking with the information technology revolution as the background can be said to be in the ascendant,and the progress of social productivity brought about by this is full of stamina.In this context,as the main body of the information revolution,Internet companies have important economic and strategic significance in all countries.With the widespread popularity of mobile payment and the huge differentiation of user needs,coupled with the rapid development of society,audiences who are submerged in group pressure and group anxiety begin to seek more ways to improve their skills.People continue to acquire knowledge through online software.The wave of payment for knowledge continues to develop from offline terminals to online mobile terminals.Many Internet knowledge payment platform companies have seized the trend of payment for knowledge and developed rapidly.However,there are many problems in the development of the Internet payment knowledge platform.Therefore,in order to promote the healthy and sustainable development of the Internet payment knowledge platform,it is necessary to explore the evolution mechanism of the Internet payment knowledge platform and propose corresponding policy recommendations.This article first studies the evolutionary game between the Internet payment knowledge platform and the knowledge producer,and analyzes the stability of the evolutionary game.The result is that the evolution strategy of the two parties can reach equilibrium under certain conditions,but the equilibrium state is not.Optimal state.Based on the problems existing in the two-party game,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for government departments,Internet knowledge payment platforms,and knowledge producers.The stability of the evolutionary game is analyzed through the system dynamics method,and two stable equilibriums are finally obtained.Point,and through the change of exogenous variables,we can discover the influence of these variables on the evolution of the Internet knowledge payment platform.Taking into account the characteristics of the lack of rationality and preference of the game subject,this article adds the study of the three-way evolutionary game of government departments,Internet knowledge payment platforms and knowledge producers under prospect theory,and uses prospect theory to evolve the system of Internet knowledge payment platforms The dynamic model is improved to increase the risk sensitivity and loss aversion coefficient of the evolutionary game subject,and further research is carried out to confirm the influence of these factors on the entire evolutionary game.Finally,in view of the characteristics and influencing factors of the evolution of Internet payment knowledge platforms,relevant policy recommendations are put forward for the development of Internet payment knowledge platforms from multiple aspects.The study found that the main participants in the evolution and development of Internet knowledge payment platforms include government departments,Internet knowledge payment platforms and knowledge producers.Although the current marketization of knowledge payment is relatively mature,if there are only Internet knowledge payment platforms and knowledge producers.There will still be certain problems.At this time,government departments must supervise and penalize violations.The simulation research is carried out on three evolutionary game subjects of government departments,Internet knowledge payment platforms and knowledge producers.The evolution strategies of these three subjects are all affected by each other's strategies,and the strategy choices of different subjects are also affected by factors such as costs and losses.In terms of risk sensitivity and loss sensitivity of tripartite entities,knowledge producers are significantly more sensitive to risks.The paper has 35 figures,13 tables,and 82 references. |
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