The Evolutionary Game Analysis On The Stratege Choices Of Government Regulation And Priamry Care Providers’ Contract Services

Health is the basis need of most people,and the realization of Healthy China heavily relies on the sustainability and efficiency of primary care system.The primary care system has externality,which means its positive utility to the whole society can’t be fully reflected by the income of the primary care providers and therefore providers are lack of motivation to provide more services in high quality.Recently,during the development of primary care’s family doctor contract services,some primary care providers only focus the signing rate of themselves,and they might try to increase their signing rate without actually providing health services to contracted residents.Such phenomenon might actually hurt the system of tiered diagnosis and treatment of our country and weaken our primary care system,and the regulation and supervision of our government.However,the technique,human resources,capital resources of the government are very limited,and therefore the ideal status is when the primary care providers have strong motivation to provide more services in high quality,and help government to reduce supervision burden or even govern inactively.From the aspect of government,it hopes that with less input including its supervision cost,primary care providers can provide as much services in good quality as possible.However,from the aspect of primary care providers,they are rational which means they will chase for profit,and sometime their action motivated by profit might deviate from public welfare.Therefore,there’s game between them.Therefore,based on the evolutionary game theory,this thesis analyzes the gambling relationship between government supervision and the contract services of primary care providers,and carries out the numerical simulation analysis by using Matlab software,which aims to find out the evolution results and evolution paths based on different initial value.It finds out that government can adjust its supervision degree to affect the strategy choices of primary care providers in short term,but in the long term providing support to the primary care providers to adjust the payoff matrix are more effective.After that,this thesis also introduces the public feedback mechanism into the model,rebuilds the evolutionary game model,and finds out that when the public feedback level is high enough,the choice of government’s strategy can’t make any difference and the providers will always choose to provide contract services in high quality voluntarily.Therefore,building up the effective public feedback mechanism and getting the public more engaged into the supervision to primary care providers,can help providers build up strong motivation to provide contract services in high quality and reduce the supervision cost and burden of government in turn.