Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Electric Vehicle Power Battery Recycling Decision Under Government Regulation And Social Supervision

With the development of electric vehicles,the number of retired power batteries is increasing rapidly.Retired power battery has high recycling value and is an important resource in circular economy.However,the current standardized battery recycling management system has not been formed in China.If retired power batteries are not properly disposed of,they will threaten public safety,cause economic losses and irreversible environmental pollution,and pose a threat to the sustainable development of power battery recycling industry.Balancing the economic and environmental benefits is an important issue in the management of retired power battery recovery of electric vehicles.Although the government has introduced relevant policies on power battery recycling,the problem of non-standard recycling is still serious.Due to the different positions of stakeholders,it is difficult to solve the environmental negative externalities caused by non-standard power battery recycling only by relying on market mechanism.It is necessary for the government to carry out macro-guidance and implement regulatory measures to coordinate the conflict between private interests of recycling enterprises and public interests,so as to realize the sustainable development of power battery recycling industry.In view of the extensive application of evolutionary game theory in the strategy evolution analysis of bounded rational agents,on the basis of defining the behavior characteristics of the different players,evolutionary game model is constructed,and then the evolutionary stability strategy and influencing factors of various players' strategy selection are analyzed.The interactive relationship and decision-making evolution process among recycling enterprises,local governments and social supervisory bodies in EV power battery recycling are deeply discussed.It is expected to provide decision support for regulating the development of retired power battery industry.Based on the evolutionary game model of power battery recycling enterprises and local government,the evolutionary stability strategy of recycling enterprises and local government has been analyzed.Combined with simulation analysis,the strategy evolutionary process of recycling enterprises and local government has been verified.Results show that there is a dynamic interaction mechanism between the two players,and different initial states will not affect the outcome of the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy of the two game models.In the case of different parameter constraint conditions,there are different evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy.On the basis of the game model between recycling enterprises and local governments,a three-party evolutionary game model composed of recycling enterprises,local governments and social supervision subject is established,and evolutionary stability equilibrium and corresponding parameter constraints of the three-party game system have been analyzed.Considering that the parameters involved in the model are more complex,a tripartite evolutionary game model based on system dynamics is constructed,and the simulation analysis is carried out by using the Vensim PLE simulation tool.The results show that different initial strategy states of recycling enterprises,local governments and social supervision subject will affect the speed and time of system convergence to equilibrium state,and may affect the evolutionary stability results of the system.Parameter sensitivity analysis has revealed the key factors affecting the strategies of all players.Among them,recycling enterprises are very sensitive to the change of local government's incentive and punishment intensity and its recycling cost.By setting up a reasonable incentive and punishment mechanism,or reducing the cost of standardized recycling,enterprises can be guided to develop in the direction of standardized recycling.Local governments are more sensitive to the change of the level of public trust improvement than the intensity of rewards and punishments for enterprises,indicating that the participation of social supervision subjects not only participates in the supervision of recycling behavior of enterprises,but also forms a constraint on the strategic choice of local governments.Although the core interests of social supervision subjects are the threat to their health and safety caused by negative environmental externalities caused by non-standard recycling,the cost and rewards of participating in supervision are the key factors affecting whether social supervision subjects participate in supervision or not.