Research On Evolutionary Game Based On Heterogeneity

Population heterogeneity exists widely in real life, in the real world, there are no twopeople are exactly alike. Because of age, wealth, gender, personality differences, differencesin knowledge structures and experience, information asymmetry and other reasons, the risk ofhuman attitudes and behavior preferences vary, so even if the different participants face thesame event, will produce completely different decision results. Thus, the behavior ofheterogeneous participants will be greatly affected. Evolutionary game theory as acutting-edge methodology applied mathematics, it abandoned the traditional game theory iscompletely rational and basic assumptions of perfect information presented boundedrationality assumption, the emphasis is a dynamic equilibrium. The heterogeneity is exactlyreflect the evolution of the dynamic process of the concrete. Therefore, the study ofheterogeneity of the state in the framework of evolutionary game theory is a very meaningfulwork, this paper attempts to analyze discussed in the following areas:(1) For the different groups involved in the nature and status of the use of evolutionarygame theory, evolutionary game model first established under homogeneous groups ofconditions, according to a positive affine transformation, standardization, divided into fourdifferent standard case, the four cases are divided into three types, namely, obtaining theirdifferent evolutionary stable strategy and replicon dynamics, given that they have differentproperties and behavior, as applied in the real world provides some theoretical basis fordecision-making.(2) Heterogeneity assumed to new perspectives, depending on the variable as aparameter is introduced into the evolutionary game model, the establishment of aheterogeneous population evolutionary game model based on evolutionary stable strategy andgives replicon dynamics under different circumstances, respectively, as well as with nature,and compared with the homogeneity were found non-cooperative game no evolutionary stablestrategy, you can use unlimited neutral stable strategy to replace it. From the analysis of theirstatic evolutionary game developed to analyze their replicon dynamics, using two differentreplicon inheritance rules to model the evolution of a dynamic process, get the type ofstability and Game Two conclusions can be dynamically generated replicon pay matrix thereare very large relations.