| Since the 1980 s,fragmentation and jungle brought up by patent bombing promotes the refinement of labor division in transaction of patent market,and the production of various intermediary organizations and platforms represented by Non-Practicing Entities specializing in patent market transactions.With the evolution of patent transaction market and the publication of a series of pro-patent Acts,NPEs also begin to utilize these pro-patent factors to fleece on the licensee.The different strategies adopted by NPEs exerted huge influences on the industry chain,and also aroused wide attention.During the process of “going out”,China’s enterprises encountered with many “obstructions” from NPEs and realized the significance of NPEs in the industry chain.Since property right protection upgraded to national strategy in 2008,the government pays more and more attention to application of property right protection in economic development.To guide the better formation and development of efficiency-enhancing type NPEs in China,as well as to regulate and restrain international NPEs’ implementation of anti-competitive strategic behavior to Chinese enterprises,it is of serious significance to study economic efficiency of NPEs.This paper starts from the perspective of market structure,and studies NPEs’ impact on industry chain efficiency of different patent acquisition methods and patent assets operation modes.The main work of the study includes the following.Firstly,it sorts out domestic and foreign research literatures,relevant theories of NPEs,and intellectual property judicial system of China,America and Europe.Secondly,it analyzes the operation mechanism of NPEs in-depth according to patent acquisition methods and patent assets operation modes,and carries out qualitative analysis on the impact of NPEs operation mechanism on industry chain efficiency.Thirdly,it classifies market structure based on vertical market structure theory and the types of patents,builds a three-stage game model,and conducts theoretical analysis on the upstream and downstream game situation and industry chain efficiency.Fourthly,it adopts American NPEs litigation data,conducts simple experimental test on the impact of NPEs patent troll on creation efficiency,carries out case study on the biggest NPEs--Intellectual Ventures,and discusses the impact of strategic troll of Intellectual Ventures on industry chain efficiency.The conclusions of the study include the following points.(1)“Patent troll” is the misunderstanding of the public of NPEs.Many NPEs exist as intellectual propertyservice providers and market intermediaries.NPEs stimulate creators as well as reduce the transaction cost of downstream production enterprises as market intermediaries,and improve industry chain efficiency generally.(2)The anti-competitive behavior of NPEs refers to the abuse of patent exclusion,and the behavior of obtaining super large amount of cash flow and obstructing competitors,which will damage the static efficiency of the downstream of the industry chain as well as promote the dynamic efficiency of the upstream of the industry chain.According to the main conclusions of this paper,the authors believes the rules and regulations of property protection in China should abide by the principle of “both combating and protecting”,and conducts the work in the below two aspects well.(1).Protect property right,and support the development of China’s professional labor division type NPEs.(2).Complete relevant system,and regulate the anti-competition behavior of NPEs. |
