Game Analysis Of Standard Essential Patent Information Disclosure

With the increasingly fierce competition based on technological innovation,patent standardization has gradually become effective competitive strategies and operational methods for enterprises.After the combination of patents and standards,possessing the standard essential patent(SEP)has the advantage of market dominant position.The dominant position is not only from the objective standard mandatory,but also from the information asymmetry between the supply and demand sides in the subjective standard formulation and implementation stage.The disclosure of information on SEP is a prerequisite for standard setting and a guarantee for ensuring the smooth implementation of standards.On the one hand,the insufficient disclosure of patent information in the standard-setting process will lead to the SEP “Trojan Horse”;on the other hand,the false disclosure of the SEP license fee information during the standard implementation phase will lead to unnecessary patent disputes,resulting in huge costs waste.The disclosure of SEP information is the result of multi-stakeholder game.Based on the analysis of the necessity and legitimacy of SEP information disclosure,this paper innovatively uses the game theory method to construct a three-party game model of SEP information disclosure in the standard formulation stage and standard implementation stage and analyzes the impact factors for disclosure.This paper first introduces the relevant terms of standards and patents,and secondly,through the necessity and standardization of the necessary essential patent information in the theory and practice,the necessity of disclosure of patent information,that is,the non-disclosure of SEP information leads to“Patent Hold-up”and “FRAND Hold-up”.The legitimacy of the disclosure of SEP information was demonstrated from the perspective of FRAND principles and trade secrets.Furthermore,this paper establishes a three-party game model that conforms to the actual situation of SEP information disclosure.By analyzing the mixed Nash equilibrium conditions found in the standard formulation stage and the standard implementation stage,the main factor affecting the standard proposal proponents in disclosure is the competitive value of unpublished patents in the standard formulation stage,while the standard organization's substantial participation in disclosure is less.In the standard implementation stage,the main factors affecting the standard license fee disclosure patent prior license fee information are the prior license fee size and judicial decision preference.Finally,based on the above game equilibrium conclusions,this paper proposes that the standard-setting organization promotes the disclosure of patent information in the standard-setting stage by implementing the mandatory disclosure obligation,clearly disclosing the content,and determining the responsibility for breach of the disclosure obligation.And choosing a judicial organ that prefers the public interest to conduct litigation rights protection can promote the disclosure of standard necessary patent information in the standard formulation stage.