Game Analysis Of Incentive Mechanism Design For Privacy Information Disclosure Of Mobile Commerce Users

Because of its flexibility,simplicity and convenience,mobile e-commerce is increasingly favored by people,and attracting many large and small mobile service providers to join.Mobile business activities often involves users' personal privacy information,such as payment information,geographic location,etc.In the big data age of"information is money",the development of service providers and the continued prosperity of the mobile commerce industry cannot be separated from various types of data.It is very key for e-commerce enterprises to obtain the uses' information.Therefore,efforts to obtain users' information is the goal of many commerce companies.In view of this,under the premise of ensuring the users' privacy and security,through effective incentive project to stimulate users' information disclosure behavior,achieving a balance between users' privacy requirements and service providers' development is of great significance for promoting the further development of the mobile commerce industry.The incentive mechanism is designed to protect the privacy needs of users and promotes the development of service providers.Service providers,as the leading players in the activities,can use multiple incentives to stimulate user' information disclosure,this paper employ the consumer and provide utility as a main analytical tool,aiming to explore the following questions:1)the impact of user's information disclosure behavior on the utility value of both parties:2)the utility function of the two parties is established according to the disclosure effect.and the service provider takes investment protection of the user' information as an incentive means to solve the user privacy disclosure conflict based on a negotiating perspective:3)in the context of a specific mobile location service.we consider the direct incentive means of economic subsidies to study the design of the incentive by the service provider.Aiming to the above problem,the main work and contribution of this paper focused on the following aspects:First.consideringy the general mobile commerce environment.service provider encourage user to invest in information security.Based on the Rubinstein bargaining bargaining gamc theory.the negotiating model is used to construct the bargaining negotiation model between them,on the basis of the amount disclosed information and the investment level of information security as the negotiation parameters.through the analysis of the model,a conflict negotiation strategy is proposed.Different from the qualitative research in the past.this research innovatively explores the incentives of service providers from a quantitative perspective by modeling their utility functions.The conclusions has strong practical guidances and provides theoretical guidance for service providers in formulating commercial marketing policies.Second,in the specific context,the SP builds a two-level programming model of the Stackelberg master-slave game based on the direct economic subsidy incentive by the utility theory,then adopting inverse induction method and introducing the Lagrange function pair.The problem is divided into different situations,through the solution to the model,the impact of the economic incentive mechanism designed by the service provider on the mutual decision-making of the two parties' benefits is analyzed,and then we propose a incentive scheme of "basic service + subsidy".In view of the current status of"subsidy fever" for service providers,this paper presents the incentive design for optimal economic subsidies through a quantitative model.The conclusion of this study provides a theoretical basis for the service providers to make a reasonable decision on the incentive process of the user's disclosure of privacy information subsidies.Through the design,the service providers and users can achieve the benefit coordination,and improve both the revenue and the total system revenue.In practice,it will help integrate the main players,and achieve a truly win-win relationship between the two parties.Finally,the research and main conclusions are summarized,combined with the problems found in the research process,the future research is prospected.