Theoretical Research Of Patent Pricing Based On Game Perspective

As an important intangible asset of an enterprise,patents occupy an increasingly important position in corporate assets.The effective evaluation of patent value plays an important role in corporate investment decisions.This paper uses game theory to study the patent trading strategy,the structure of patent trading market and its influence on patent value evaluation.The output of patent products is regarded as the agent variable of social welfare level,and the profits of patent production enterprises are regarded as the agent variable of patent value.This paper analyzes the impact of patent bundling and separate trading on the output of patent products and the profits of patent production enterprises,and compares the output of patent products and the profits of patent production enterprises when different market structures are balanced.The results show that:(1)the product output of patent bundling is lower than that of separate trading,and the product output under both trading strategy will decrease with the increase of member correlation;(2)The profit of the production of patent bundled transactions is higher than that of separate transactions,and the profits of enterprises under the two trading strategies will decrease as the correlation of members increases;(3)When patents are traded separately,the product output of master-slave game competition equilibrium is higher than that of static equilibrium,and the product output of master-slave game competition equilibrium decreases with the increase of member correlation;(4)When patents are traded separately,the relationship between corporate profits in the master-slave game competition equilibrium and corporate profits in the static equilibrium is related to the degree of patent relevance,and corporate profits in the master-slave game competition equilibrium decrease first and then increase with the increase of member relevance.