Research On Rent-seeking Game Of Construction Project Agent System Under Limited Rationality

With the implementation of comprehensive reform,the pace of investment system reform in China has been accelerated.The promotion of government investment project agent system has greatly improved the level of project management and work efficiency.It is helpful for the government to control and supervise the construction of non-profit-making projects.Although the mode of project agent construction has been implemented and popularized for many years,the standards on agency construction issued by our country up to now are still not perfect.The guiding standards of agency construction are not uniform.In terms of the standards for collecting fees for construction fees,the standards for collecting fees from all over the country are not completely clear.The level of marketization of domestic agent systems is still relatively low,and the comprehensive quality of construction agents is not high.Under the condition of government investment and construction project,the agent unit performs the management function in the whole process of the project construction instead of the government owner,and is endowed with great power in each link of the project implementation process.Because of the low standard of agency fees in our country,in order to gain more profit,the contractors may be induced to provide them with rent,and the contractors will obtain the contract rights of the construction projects on behalf of the contractors.And in the construction process of the project to obtain additional income to meet the requirements of the agency units,may actively provide rent to the agent units.As a result,the contractors and agencies collude with each other to form rent-seeking groups.The use of "power and money trading" to generate non-operating monopoly profits for the government owners and even the state and society caused economic losses.On the basis of analyzing the current research situation of agent system and rent-seeking behavior at home and abroad,this paper defines the related concepts of government investment agency construction project,introduces stakeholder theory,classical game theory and prospect theory.This paper systematically analyzes and divides the benefit subjects of government investment construction projects,and extracts the government owners,agents and contractors as the main game players,and analyzes in detail the respective rent-seeking behaviors of the game subjects.The main reasons and possible consequences of rent-seeking behavior of government investment construction projects are explained,and then the rent-seeking game model under finite rationality is established,and the countermeasures against rent-seeking are put forward.The purpose of this paper is to widen the scope of research in the field of agent construction and the application of game theory,to promote the application and development of agent system in China,to improve the management level and work efficiency of agent system,and to perfect the mode of government investment project construction.To improve the efficiency of government construction project funds and to avoid rent-seeking behavior in the agency project to provide some reference.