| Since the reform and opening up,chinese pharmaceutical industry has developed rapidly,with a growth rate higher than GDP in the same period.It has gradually become one of the largest pharmaceutical markets in the world.The medical industry is an important part of chinese national economy.In the process of rapid development of the medical industry,rentseeking has gradually become a problem that cannot be ignored.The Changchun Changsheng fake vaccine case in 2018 is a typical case of medical rent-seeking.Medical rent-seeking not only destroys the competition rules of the pharmaceutical market,but also leads to the deviation of drug prices from the real value,increases the burden of patients,causes the loss of social welfare,and even more serious may cause major medical accidents.In order to ensure the good order of the medical industry,the governance of medical rent-seeking is very important.Firstly this essay sorts out the domestic and foreign literatures on rent-seeking behavior in the pharmaceutical industry,and summarizes the contributions and deficiencies of the existing literatures.Second,the game theory and evolutionary game theory combined with the feature of the medical profession,on the basis of,respectively,to build a pharmaceutical enterprise within the medical rent-seeking competition model,government departments and regulatory mechanism of evolution game model between the personnel of public power,government departments and public rights transfer mechanism between the evolutionary game model,in order to compare the regulatory mechanism and transfer mechanism,the government has also been established with the evolutionary game model of mixed strategy between the personnel of public power,and use the Matlab simulation of evolutionary game model of equilibrium simulation.Finally,based on the equilibrium results of the competition model and the evolutionary game model,conclusions are drawn and some policy suggestions are put forward.Based on the equilibrium results of the competition model and the evolutionary game model,the research conclusions and suggestions are as follows:(1)The equilibrium results of the rent-seeking competition model of pharmaceutical enterprises show that the degree of rentseeking is directly proportional to the rewards and the number of competitors,and inversely proportional to the difficulty of the success of the competition;(2)The evolutionary game model of regulation between government departments and public officials has three evolutionary situations,and the evolutionary game model of transfer payment between the two sides has five evolutionary situations.(3)In order to reduce excessive internal competition of pharmaceutical enterprises,abnormal profit space of medical market should be compressed,reasonable pricing mechanism of the market should be improved,behaviors of pharmaceutical enterprises should be standardized and restrained,entry threshold of pharmaceutical industry should be increased,and qualification threshold of pharmaceutical representatives should be established;(4)the external supervision,government subsidies to curb rent-seeking rentseeking punishment and obvious effect,so the government should strengthen the supervision team construction,give full play to the supervisory function of the network,encourages the masses to expose irregularities,perfect the public rights personnel salary incentive system,establish a accurate and reasonable performance evaluation,and increase penalties for rentseeking behavior. |
