Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Government And Enterprises Under Renewable Portfolio Standard

The consumption mode of fossil energy,such as coal,leads to the sharp consumption of energy and the continuous deterioration of the ecological environment,which makes the application of renewable energy more and more concerned and valued by the society.In recent years,the growth rate of renewable energy generation in China is obvious,but problems such as energy access to the Internet,consumption and so on are gradually emerging.As an important promoter of the development of renewable energy industry,it is urgent for the government to realize the low-carbon transformation of power structure.At present,the implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standard has been on the right track in China,and the complementary Tradable Green Certificate System is also being promoted.Scientific and reasonable formulation and implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standard and Tradable Green Certificate System,and improvement of policy implementation efficiency are effective ways to coordinate the common development of economic society and ecological environment and realize low-carbon economy.Firstly,this paper introduces the research background,research significance and current research status of the relevant literature.Then,on the basis of the three renewable energy incentive policy concepts of Feed-in-Tariff,Renewable Portfolio Standard and Tradable Green Certificate System,it focuses on the current implementation of these three incentive policies in China Clarified the importance of the transition from Feed-in-Tariff to Renewable Portfolio Standard.Based on the policy background,this paper starts from two ways for power generation companies to fulfill their renewable energy quota obligations,and builds an evolutionary game model between local governments and power generation enterprises: first of all,aiming at the power generation enterprises’ self-consumption to fulfill the quota obligation,this paper combines the reward and punishment mechanism and the learning curve and other related theories to build an evolutionary game model for local governments and enterprises to complete quota obligations,focusing on the impact of local government reward and punishment mechanism,unit supervision cost,quota standard,enterprise learning curve and other factors on the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS).And it is demonstrated by the analysis of examples.Secondly,aiming at the behavior that power generation enterprises complete the quota obligation by trading green certificates,the evolutionary game model of the behavior of local governments and enterprises trading green certificates is constructed,focusing on the impact of government punishment,supervision cost,green certificate price and social benefits of enterprises on the evolutionary results.Finally,according to the research results,this paper gives corresponding countermeasures and suggestions in policy making and policy implementation.