Studying On Selected Strategic Supplier Of Supply Chain With Sequential Game Modeling At The Beginning And End Of The Trial Period

In twenty-first Century, getting along with the aggravation of the marketcompetition, in order to meet the increasingly diversified consumer demand, thetraditional management mode with manufacturing enterprises as the center will bereplaced with modern supply chain management mode with cooperation as the core.The upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain should establish the strategicpartnership of mutual trust, cooperation and coordination, information sharing.Considering the asymmetry of information before manufacturer and supplier in theestablishment of cooperation relationship, solving the adverse selection problem as thestarting point, this paper is studying on selected strategic supplier of supply chain withsequential game modeling at the beginning and end of the trial period, bring theinterests of their own, and may be beneficial to maximize the overall effectiveness ofthe supply chain.This paper is based on the research-based theory and statementanalysis, and the main content and associated conclusions as follows:（1） Based on the displaying principle of strategic supplier selected modeling, withdelivery-quality γ_i, on-time of delivery η_j and supply-cost ω_k indicators ofintroducing the type of supplier; suppliers take the initiative to reveal their own truetype θ_ijk; based on a game process, from the initial design pay π_ijk, reward m_ijk andpunishment p_ijk payment contract, we obtain payment contract ((π_ijk，m_ijk，p_ijk)information symmetry conditions π_ijk+（γ_iη_j）m_ijk-（1-γ_iη_j）p_ijk=U+ω_k optimal;（2） Under the condition of asymmetric information, suppliers of different costsprovide the same pay contracts, and the optimal setting to the payment of the contractmakes the high-cost supplier the reservation utility’s U expected revenue; then thelow capacity supplier selection the contract contains only the initial paymentπ_22k=U+ω₂, suppliers of the high ability choose the contract also contains theconclusions of reward and punishment; with payment of the contract model (π_ijk，m_ijk，p_ijk)based on contractions, mechanisms eliminate inferior qualitysuppliers to build low-quality suppliers so as to get zero-pay contract model;（3） Based on the features of manufacturers and strategic suppliers in the supplychain we apply a long-term, repeated game, which including the mechanism of theprobationary period, and further distinguish between the type of supplier. We build thedynamic of the game the number of n values in decision trial period evaluationmodel, and solve manufacturers in the control game under the condition of the gamecosts in order to aggregate excellent rateP*evaluation of the number of times of thevalue of the optimal solution, as a contract design of confidence, make inferior qualitysuppliers withdraw from the contract before the beginning of trial period;（4） With the use of separating equilibrium mechanism, we design a trial periodprior eliminate inferior quality suppliers mechanisms model for manufacturers, inferiorquality suppliers would be excluded before the start of trial period, set up a modelwhich minimize the total expected payoff of manufacturers as objective function, bymeans of the trial period and the end of the trial period, suppliers are obliged to pay theamount of the contract model, at last, a simplified model of binary linear programmingis given.