Research On Strategic Co-opetition For A Collaborative Development Supply Chain Of Large Passenger Aircraft In Introduction Period Based On Game Theory

The manufacturing of large passenger aircraft(LPA)is important to national technology and state power.The manufacturing of LPA has a long industrial chain,wide coverage,and a strong interactive effect for the development of economics and technology,so it bears an important role to develop the industry.The mode of “Main manufacturer-supplier”,referred to as the "MS" mode,is the optimal management mode determined by the international giant of LPA based on a long-term operation practice.The main manufacturer is responsible for development and production in collaboration with many suppliers in MS.The crucial advantage of MS lies in that the main manufacturer and suppliers share R&D cost,the risks,and profits that may be faced in the whole project.The manufacturing of Chinese LPA also adopts MS mode for its collaborative development based on the advanced experience of international firms,and adheres to independent research and international cooperation.However,the manufacturer of Chinese LPA experiences an introduction period and presents as a weak ability because of a late-starting time,lacking management experience,lacking key technology,technical barriers and restrictions,and so on.Therefore,it determines that Chinese LPA is faced with urgent problems for competing and cooperating with powerful firms in international.Thus,the thesis studies the co-opetition strategies based on the crucial challenges of Chinese LPA so that can provide possible control strategies and useful management insights for the main manufacturer in China.The main works show as follows.First,the thesis characterizes cooperation and coordination strategies in the supply chain of LPA.Capital-constrained supplier and downstream competition are considered in a “manufacturer-suppliers(MS)” mode with a weak main manufacturer and a powerful supplier.The capital-constrained supplier provides a key element to the main manufacturer and encroaches in the downstream market through the simultaneous production of substitutable final products.The weak main manufacturer designs a revenue-sharing contract based on a relationship-specific investment to cooperate with the powerful supplier and finally improve its indigenous technological capability.By building Stackelberg and bargaining games,the co-opetition equilibriums and co-ordination strategies are derived and compared under different conditions.The results show that the cost structure,the abilities of the two players,and the ability of the main manufacturer’s technology learning have significant effects on the optimal strategies;moreover,the impacts of the threshold value of the supplier’s capital and the relationship-specific investment on the optimal cooperation strategies are very different.Overall,the coordination strategy can alleviate downstream competition and enhance both players’ profitability effectively.Second,the thesis investigates the strategic cooperation of two competitive suppliers with different abilities and a weak main manufacturer in the supply chain of LPA,where the stronger supplier provides one key element to the main manufacturer and encroaches on the downstream market by producing substitutable final products simultaneously.We consider multi-stage decisions,the main manufacturer signs a revenue-sharing contract based on a relationship-specific investment with the stronger supplier.By building different models based on centralized,decentralized,and cooperative decisions,the equilibrium strategies are characterized under downstream competition,and optimal cooperation strategies are derived by building bargaining game and multi-period game models.Third,we study the coordination of MS mode under the background of supply chain competition.In consideration of the competition among multiple suppliers and manufacturers,the weak main manufacturer selects a strong supplier to cooperate and designs a relational contract based on specific asset investment.The purpose of the strategy lies in allocating the benefits derived from the cooperation so that can stimulate the strong supplier to cooperate with the weak main manufacturer.We illustrate the equilibrium decisions of the competition among multiple suppliers and manufacturers under different scenarios,and then analyze the dominance and the evolution of the relational contract from different aspects.Fourth,the thesis aims to figure out the strategies on technology cooperation and domestic supplier cultivation for a weak main manufacturer in the supply chain of LPA.We investigate two competitive main manufacturers and two competitive suppliers who exhibit differential ability.Several crucial characters in the supply chain of LPA are considered.A revenue-sharing contract,a technology licensing contract,and a joint contract with technology licensing and cost-sharing are designed to facilitate the technology cooperation and supplier cultivation.And three multi-stage games are developed to explore the optimal strategies.Based on a benchmark model,optimal decisions and a comparative analysis are characterized to examine the interaction between technology cooperation and supplier cultivation.Overall,the impacts of key parameters on the optimal strategies are very different.Fifth,from the perspective of airworthiness certificate in the introduction period of LPA,the thesis studies the cooperative strategies with consideration of the risk evolution mechanism of airworthiness certificate.We first focus on clarifying the key issues of international airworthiness certificate,and then identifying the risk of airworthiness certificate and the game between different stakeholders based on tacit competition.The models are established under the scenario of centralized decision and decentralized decision.The optimal degree of technology openness of the advanced countries and the optimal technology effort degree of the weak main manufacturer are obtained.We also analyze the risk feedback mechanism of airworthiness certificate risk.A system dynamics model for risk evolution of airworthiness certificate is established,and dynamic simulation of airworthiness risk propagation under different scenarios is carried out.The study reveals the complex communication mechanism of risk evolution in airworthiness certificate,and the optimal decision-making rules of stakeholders are demonstrated in case of random and dynamic improvement of the main manufacturer’s ability.