| Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) is an integrated closed circuit system formed through combining traditional"forward direction"supply chain with reverse feedback process (viz. Reverse Supply Chain, acronym for RSC). In essence, it makes the open circuit process of"resources-production-consumption-abandonment"being transformed into the closed circuit feedback circulating process through forward delivery and reverse recycle. In the whole operating process of the supply chain, CLSC takes into account environmental factors and the efficiency of resource use in comprehensive way, based upon modern information technology and technology of supply chain management. It minimizes the environmental side effect and maximizes the efficiency of resource use in the whole lifecycle of raw materials acquisition, processing, packing, storing, transportation, use, abandonment as well as recycle.The present dissertation studies the quantitative models of CLSC by game theory, to analyze the incentive and coordination mechanism of all sides, to expand the research field and method of CLSC, to improve its operability, so as to make the expansion of CLSC of more practical significance.Chapter One introduces the research significance and present situation of CLSC. Then Chapter Two introduces some basic theories about CLSC so as to provide a theoretical framework for the following studies.Chapter Three and Chapter Four deal with the mechanism of coordination of RSC and CLSC. The result shows that, in implementing CLSC, it is only through the enhancement of coordination and cooperation between members of the supply chain that the interests of respective members could be protected and the probable risk in the systematic environment might be reduced. In addition, the cooperation strategy can not only maximize the interests of system, but also benefit the consumers and thus improve their satisfaction towards products. However, not all members of CLSC would accept cooperation due to their effort to maximize self-interests; the cooperation is possible only when the self-interest of each member is guaranteed. Therefore, it needs to build up an efficient system of interest distribution so as to realize the win-win goal to maximize the member interests and system interests.However, the coordination between members of CLSC is based on the ideal condition of complete information. In fact, to a large extent, information is incompletely between businesses. Therefore, considering the possible deceits in RSC, Chapter Five builds up the signal game model in the buyback of RSC under incomplete information of the used products'quality, analyzes perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the model, including separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium. In addition, it also constructs a signal game under the condition of uncertain market demand information; the analysis results show that, only when the high demand manufacturer provides the buyback price of separating equilibrium, the take-backer can get the true information of market demand. Under the condition of pooling equilibrium, the low demand manufacturer would imitate the high demand manufacturer, which decreases the interests of the latter and thus prevents a smooth realization of RSC.The cooperative strategy of enterprises requires the building of long-term relationship of mutual trust in their cooperation, which can improve the resources integrating ability and thus make the cooperation more productive. In fact, the choice of cooperative partners is an important factor that influences the operative performance of CLSC. Chapter Six, through putting FAHP into the practice of choosing CLSC cooperative partners, avoids the one-sidedness and subjectivity of choices. The use of fuzzy thoughts is good to evaluate the evaluation of experts.Chapter Six deals with the incentive problem of CLSC as well. First of all, it discusses the incentive problem under governmental regulation by the principal-agency theory, concluding that the plan of simultaneously implementing reward and punishment is the best incentive way of government. In addition, it studies the incentive mechanism of RT-CLSC. The analysis shows that manufacturers would work harder to motivate the sell efforts when retailers build larger facilities. It is proposed that the period of agency should be prolonged so as to encourage them to take back the used products more actively. In addition, it is proposed that manufacturers should use fixed payment to motivate the efforts of retailers to take back; and it is suitable to motivate the selling efforts by the payment in accordance with performance. Finally, this chapter deals with the incentive mechanism of TPT-CLSC. The study reveals that under the condition of asymmetric information, the cost of manufacturers is higher than that of the symmetric information; meanwhile the third party themselves need some operative ability and should keep a corresponding effort so as to maximize the benefits.The conclusion of the above chapters is nothing but a static, theoretic one. In reality, the growth of CLSC is a dynamic, evolutionary process. Chapter Seven, making use of evolvement game theory, deals with the evolving question of whether open-minded manufacturers and conservative manufacturers would actively implement RSC. The analysis shows that, 1) Under market mechanism, the manufacturer could have the enthusiasm to implement RSC only when the implementation increases the extra benefits; 2) When the relatively high cost of carrying out RSC makes the manufacturer lose, they would take a passive attitude towards RSC. It is the high time that governments could make the manufacturer accept RSC through some adjustment measures, for example, to implement punishment mechanism for those manufacturers of negative externality so as to adjust their decisions, and the punish can be effective only when it is severe enough; to subsidize those manufacturers of positive externality so as to influence their decisions, and the subsidy can be effective only when it is adequate enough.
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