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A Study On Supervision Mechanism Of Collusion-proof In Urban Housing Demolition And Relocation

Posted on:2011-10-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M FanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199330338982941Subject:Administrative Management
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The collusions between government and enterprises are general phenomena that exist in many fields of our country's economic and society, and urban housing demolition has no exception. At present, one is the local governments driven by "land revenue" and the demolisher driven by the commercial interests become interests community, the other is government officials's rent-seeking, which have led to the collusions between government and enterprises be in a large number of breeding. The collusions between government and enterprises has seriously damaged the interests of the demolished, exacerbated the conflicts in urban housing demolition, and led to a large number of disputes and illegal demolition events. Therefore, building supervision mechanism of collusion-proof in urban housing demolition, which not only has important practical significance for resolving the conflicts, but also has important theoretical significance for further improving the theories and policies of urban demolition.Based on the above background, this thesis made an intensive study of the problem and the cause of the collusions in urban housing demolition, and tried to build supervision mechanism of collusion-proof in urban housing demolition,with the collusion and collusion-proof theory. Urban housing demolition activities are mainly the game and action selection of three parties which including the local government, the demolisher, the demolished. Firstly, based on a case analysis, this thesis analysed the problem and the mian forms of the collusions in urban housing demolition; Secondly, based on game theory, analysed interest demand and action preferences of different interest subjects, and deduced the generation of collusion between government and enterprises on the premise of that all the interest subjects are the rational"economic man", then explored inherent mechanism of the collusion formation. Thirdly, quoted from collusion and collusion-proof theory,the supervision mechanism of collusion-proof in urban housing demolition are designed on the basis of the above study. Finally, puted forward some suggestions related policy suggestions.The results show that, there are two main forms of the collusion in the urban demolition: one is the collusion between the local government agencies and the demolisher; the other is the collusion between the government officials and the demolisher. The main causes of collusion are the convergence of the intrinsic interests between the local government and the demolisher, and the defects in the external demolition system which may create the conditions for them to conspire. The main contents about the supervision mechanism of collusion-proof in urban housing demolition includes: Firstly, from the perspective of incentives, building a reasonable pay system, performance evaluation mechanism and the reputation mechanism, creating internal incentives, to reduce the collusion motivation of local government; Secondly, from the perspective of punishment, building internal and external supervision mechanism, to increase the collusion cost of the local government; Thirdly, building a reasonable relocation compensation mechanism and information disclosure mechanisms, to reduce the collusion revenue of the local government. Through the efforts of three, increase the collusion cost of the local government, reduce the collusion revenue, to achieve the purpose of collusion-proof.
Keywords/Search Tags:Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation, Interest Subjects, Collusion, Game Theory, Supervision Mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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