The Evolution Of Enterprise Internet Public Opinion And Game Analysis Of Guidance Strategy

With the development of network technology and the popularity of social media,the Internet has become the main place for the public to exchange opinions and an important channel for public opinion dissemination.Negative public opinion on the Internet will not only undermine the expectations of stakeholders but may also trigger further actions by the public(netizens),leading to a crisis of public opinion on the Internet and negatively affecting the organization.The online public opinion crisis will affect the enterprise's reputation and potential economic benefits.As an independent economic entity,the enterprise hopes to minimize the losses caused by the public opinion crisis.However,due to the complexity and change of online public opinion,enterprises have relatively insufficient awareness of it and lack scientific planning for public relations crisis public relations strategies.How to deal with public opinion crises in different situations has become an important issue.On the basis of existing research,this thesis focuses on the evolution of public opinions and behaviors in the crisis of online public opinion,as well as the losses they cause to enterprises.This thesis constructs an opinion dynamics model under a dynamic network,and a behavior evolution model based on a cost-benefit framework and discusses the enterprise's opinion and behavior guidance strategy.The main content of this thesis is as follows:(1)In terms of public opinion,this thesis introduces the issue of public opinion dissemination into the study of public opinion evolution,proposes a public opinion evolution model under a dynamic network,and analyzes the enterprise's opinion guidance strategy on this basis.Potential members of the public may be interested in public opinion and join the discussion,and then withdraw from the discussion due to limited time and energy,thus forming a dynamic public opinion network.This thesis considers two dynamic network models based on topic generation and social relations.The SIR model and the independent information cascade model are used to describe the process of public opinion dissemination caused by public participation and withdrawal from the discussion.At the same time,the interactive process of the opinion of the discussing netizens is described based on the opinion dynamics.Then,through experimental simulation,it explores how the enterprise's guidance timing and the choice of guidance opinion value in different situations affect the loss of the enterprise caused by the evolution of public opinion.By guiding the opinions of individuals in the public opinion network,it will simultaneously lead to the expansion of public opinion and the improvement of public opinion.The relative strength of these two effects depends on the network density,the initial discussion scale,the tendency of the public to participate in public opinion,the strength and continuity of the opinion guidance effect,and other factors.These factors will affect the loss caused by the public opinion of the enterprise.Based on the dynamic network of topic generation,the research finds that:(i)a larger network density can strengthen the effect of opinion guidance and reduce the loss of public opinion.(ii)The effect of the timing of opinion guidance depends on the network structure and public participation tendency.With a larger network density,a larger initial discussion scale,or strong public participation,early opinion guidance can reduce the loss of public opinion.Otherwise,there should be no rush for opinion guidance.(iii)Reducing the attraction of opinion guidance to potential netizens can improve public opinion while restraining the scale of public opinion from expanding further.This means that companies should strengthen their interaction with netizens on a daily basis,so as to reduce the sensitivity of enterprise opinion guidance to netizens' discussions.(iv)If netizens have bounded confidence in differentiated opinions,a moderate value of opinion should bring a minimal loss of public opinion under a certain degree of bounded confidence;while under a larger degree of bounded confidence,early guidance,and active self-defense will be achieved the best results.This means that if the public and the enterprise have different opinions and it is difficult to accept opinions that are too different from their own,the enterprise needs to pay attention to the expression of its own opinions when guiding,and can neither blindly follow the public opinions nor be too stubborn.Based on the dynamic network of social relations,the results show that:(?)Information dissemination depends on the network structure,so a greater network density increases the scale of public opinion.(?)The increase in network density also leads to an increase in the scope of influence of opinion guidance and a decrease in the influence weight.Therefore,its influence on the steady-state average opinion depends on the tendency of participating in public opinion.Specifically,when the public has a strong tendency to participate in public opinion,greater network density improves public views;conversely,greater network density makes public views more negative.(?)Changes in the timing of guidance have no significant impact on the scale of public opinion,but early guidance can better improve public opinion,so it is always more beneficial to conduct opinion guidance early.(?)Considering different types of network structures,this research finds that the guidance behavior has similar structural characteristics in random networks,small-world networks,and scale-free networks,which shows that the laws disclosed in this thesis are robust.(?)By comparing individuals with different types of network influences,it is found that the network nodes with the greatest degree of influence have obvious advantages in guidance opinions,which brings enlightenment to how companies manage public opinion crises in networks with different individual influences.(2)In terms of netizens behavior,this thesis studies the adaptive learning and adjustment of netizens group strategies in public opinion crisis events.Netizens may adopt differentiated behaviors due to different attributions of responsibility,value judgments,and interest appeals to public opinion crisis events.At the same time,individual netizens with different behavior strategies learn from each other to maximize their own benefits.At the same time,enterprise strategy can also affect the behavioral benefits of netizens.The trade-off between costs and benefits is a key factor that affects the strategic choices of both companies and netizens.Therefore,from the perspective of cost-benefit,this thesis uses a general dynamic replication equation to describe the evolution of netizens' behavior.demonstrates the influence of enterprise crisis public relations strategies on netizens'behavior trends,and analyzes how to change and incentive netizens with different strategies through reasonable and positive responses.Further,this thesis also considers complex network structure,sub-optimal learning,and behavior of netizens defending the enterprise,expanding the basic model.Finally,case analysis and numerical simulation analysis are carried out.The results show that(?)The coping strategies adopted by the enterprise will affect the netizens' income.Companies can guide netizens to learn the strategies with the highest benefits through their own strategic choices.Learning will lead to changes in the proportion of netizens with different strategies,thereby changing the interests of the enterprise and affecting the enterprise's crisis public relations decisions.For example,when adopting more active crisis public relations response strategies,companies should pay attention to giving all informed netizens non-discriminatory treatment,and avoid response measures that target only radical netizens,so as not to trigger large-scale radical actions.(?)Regardless of which behavioral strategy occupies a dominant position,netizens may mistakenly learn sub-optimal strategies.Therefore,from the perspective of enterprise responding strategy,it is necessary to ensure that the incentives for moderate netizens' behaviors exceed radical behaviors to a large extent,so as to guide netizens'behaviors more effectively.(iii)Enterprises can influence the behavioral and strategic choices of netizens by encouraging or inhibiting the exchanges of netizens.For example,when netizens are more inclined to choose radical strategies that are detrimental to the enterprise,the enterprise should try to encourage more exchanges among netizens to make them learn and adopt other actions;if netizens are more inclined to adopt a moderate strategy,companies should try to avoid excessive communication between netizens to prevent them from following the behavior of radical groups.(?)If the netizens' defending behaviors benefit the enterprise sufficiently,the enterprise will choose a proactive crisis public relations strategy to deal with the public opinion crisis,and at the same time,the proportion of the defending strategy group will continue to increase.(?)The potential threat to enterprise reputation from netizens who do not adopt the defending strategy is an important factor that prompts companies to pay attention to and actively encourage netizens to adopt defending strategies.When the reputation threat weakens rapidly due to the reduction of other strategies in the netizens group,the enterprise will abandon the positive response strategy,because the reputation benefits brought by the group adopting the defending strategy are not enough to cover the cost of the enterprise's active actions.The main innovations of this thesis are as followed,(1)The analysis of the evolution of public opinion in the existing literature is usually based on static networks.This article introduces the dynamics of the public opinion network structure and scales into the public opinion dynamics model by considering the public's entry and exit of public opinion discussions,which makes up the weaknesses that the existing public opinion dynamics research neglect of the dynamics of the network of public opinion.The existing literature on opinion dynamics only pays attention to the content nature of the opinion(such as whether the evaluation is positive or not,whether a consensus can be reached),but ignores the dynamic nature of the public opinion network.This thesis combines information dissemination theory and the Opinion Dynamics model to describe the evolution process of public opinion under the dynamic changes of the scale and structure of public opinion network.It combines the two dimensions of public opinion scale and public opinion to measure the loss of negative opinion to enterprises.This thesis demonstrates the important influence of the initial public opinion scale and public participation in discussions on the evolution of public opinions and expands the theoretical framework for studying the evolution of opinions in public opinion crises.(2)The existing literature basically uses case studies and qualitative analysis methods for opinion guidance.This article incorporates opinion guidance as a quantitative operation strategy into the dynamic network public opinion dynamics model,and analyzes the optimal application conditions of opinion guidance strategies.This thesis studies the common methods of opinion guidance,that is,the use of individuals in the public opinion network to guide the public's opinion to change in a positive direction.Existing literature is usually based on static networks,so it only pays attention to issues such as guide point selection and consensus formation speed.This thesis studies the key issues in the actual public opinion crisis public relations,such as the timing and the guidance value of opinion guidance,and analyzes the influence of the initial public opinion scale,public participation in discussion,network structure,bounded confidence threshold and other factors on the opinion guidance effect.Guidance,as a public opinion management strategy,is a key trade-off in the evolution of public opinion in dynamic networks,and its effectiveness in different situations is discussed.(3)The existing literature assumes that the enterprise public opinion crisis response strategy is based on its own perceived responsibility attribution.This article discusses the behavior motives of netizens in the crisis from the perspective of cost-benefit,analyzes the interactive game with netizens' behavior and corporate response strategies,and the guidance of enterprises to the behavior of netizens.In the existing literature,when studying the behavior management of netizens in public opinion crisis,few studies consider the interests of netizens and differentiated behaviors,and the corresponding behavior management strategies are not effective.Based on the cost-benefit framework,this thesis uses the general dynamic replication equation to describe the strategy learning and behavior evolution process of netizens in pursuit of profit maximization,as well as the influence of enterprise crisis public relations strategies in the process.At the same time,the basic model has been extended by introducing complex networks,sub-optimal learning,and netizens defending strategy.In addition,this thesis analyzes how companies can reduce the loss of public opinion crisis by changing the incentives for netizens in their active crisis response strategies.This thesis starts from the perspective of management science,pays attention to the real public opinion crisis management problem,and analyzes the public opinion and behavior evolution process in the network public opinion crisis and the guidance strategy of the enterprise based on the problem.It deepens the understanding of the evolutionary law of public opinion crisis,enriches the theoretical system in the field of public opinion crisis management,and provides certain practical guidance for public opinion crisis management in complex situations.