Research On The Government Reward-penalty Mechanisms Of Closed-loop Supply Chain With Different Dominant Power Structures

With the rapid development of economy and the fierce market competition,the products upgrading have been accelerated.As results,more and more waste products have been produced,which is a common phenomenon in the electrical and electronic industry.According to incomplete statistic: the number of waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE)all over the world has reached 65 million tons by 2017,which increased by about 33% compared to 49 million tonnes in 2012.The United Nations reported that China produces WEEE weigh up to 2.3 million tons each year,of which 80 percent can't be properly handled.If so much WEEE can't be properly handled,it not only can cause the waste of recyclable resources,but also can pollute environment and endanger people's health.Thus,WEEE recycling and remanufacturing in closed loop supply chain(CLSC)has gradually attracted extensive concerns of countries around the world because of the crisis of the resource shortage and environment pollution.Many countries establish relevant laws and regulations to force enterprises to recycle and remanufacture the WEEE.For example,Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)law proposed by the European Union requires that the manufactures are responsible for recycling used products.As the largest producer of WEEE,China put the WEEE Recycling Management Regulation into effect in2011,which requires the manufacturers to pay for the WEEE recycling funds used to subsidize the recycler for recycling WEEE.Sometimes we can regard the recycling funds and subsidy as the reward and penalty policy respectively.The control of greenhouse gases(GHGs)emission has become an important issue of the world since 1990 s,what's more,the governments around the world have established GHG reduction targets in the next 10-50 years.As the largest manufacturing country in the world,China faces huge pressure with energy conservation and emission reduction.Under the pressure of environmental pollution and resource shortage,this paper makes the following expansion and innovation based on the previous related researches:(1)It can be seen from the relavant researches that the majority scholars pay attention to the government's guidance on the recycling in RSC,only a few scholars research the government mechanisms or policies which integrate the SC and the RSC considering the environment pollution and resources shortage same time,such as the carbon emission RPM and the recovery RPM.(2)Most of the previous researches focused on the manufacturer-led CLSC,this paper extends the research object to manufacturer-led CLSC,retailer-led CLSC and recycler-led CLSC including the competing vertical node enterprises according to the actual economic development.(3)Based on the above(1)(2),considering the general situation of asymmetric information in CLSC,the paper makes an early exploration of the government RPM in CLSC of different dominant structures with competing node enterprises under asymmetric information.Under asymmetric information,we research the government reward-penalty mechanism(RPM)including government's guidance on WEEE recycling in RSC and the carbon emission constraint in SC at the same time of CLSC with different dominant structures.We research the manufacturer-led,retailer-led and recycler-led CLSC in chapter 3-5 under asymmetric information using principal agent and dynamic game theory.and compare the optimal results of a certain CLSC in different situation.And the Stackerberg game models in different situations are built with the principal agent theory.Then we explore how the RPM effect the optimal decisions of CLSC with different dominant structures.The capter 6 simulating the optimal decisions of a certain dominant CLSC under different situations,meanwhile,the influence of enterprises competition on the system decisions and member benefits are analysed as well.Firstly,the manufacturer-led CLSC includes a dominant manufacturer and two competing retailers.The retailer-one recycles the WEEE,and we assume that the retailer-one's fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information.The government impements the carbon emission RPM on the dominant manufacturer and the recovery RPM on the retailer-one.The research results show that:(1)Regardless of the retailer-one's fixed recycling cost type,the carbon emission RPM isn't good for guiding WEEE recycling.Recovery rate RPM can not only guide WEEE recycling effectively,but also benefits the consumers.(2)From the perspective of environment,society,economy,the optimal RPM needs to satisfy some conditions: the recovery rate reward-penalty intensity should exceed the critical value with the fixed carbon emission reward-penalty intensity;Alternatively,the reward-penalty intensity should be less than the critical value when the reward-penalty intensity is constant.(3)In any case,there's always going to be the retailer-one's profit is higher than the retailer-two's profit.This suggests that the retailer-one participating in WEEE recycling can gain competitive advantages in competitive situation,meanwhile,it also helps to attract retailer-two to participate in WEEE recycling.(4)No matter what situation,there's always w_H?w_L,?_H??_L ,which means that the recycler with high fixed recycling cost has the obvious scale advantages.(5)It shows that the retailers' competition is not only good for the WEEE recycling,but also benefits the system members.Secondly,there are single manufacturer,single domiant retailer and two competing recyclers in retailer-led CLSC.It is assumed that the fixed recycling cost of recyclers is asymmetric information,the government impements the carbon emission RPM on the manufacturer and the recovery RPM on two competing recyclers.The key research findings are summarized as follows:(1)In the retailer-led CLSC,the retail price,wholesale price and the retailer's profit are all fixed,namely,they are free from the government PRM.(2)No matter what type of fixed recycling cost is,the WEEE recycling price,buyback price and recycler's profit are not affected by the carbon emission reward-penalty intensity;However,the recovery rate reward-penalty mechanism increases recycling price,while the decreases buyback price gradually.(3)Assuming that other conditions stay the same,the moderate recycling competition is helpful to WEEE recycling price improvement,while WEEE buyback price,recycler's profit and manufacturer's profit always decrease with competition increasing.It's strongly proved that although the moderate recycling competition can motivate consumers to return WEEE,it cannot fully mobilize the system members to recycle WEEE.(4)In any case,there's always w_H?w_L ,r_H?r_L and,?_MH??_ML,?_rH??_rL.Apparently,it suggests that recyclers with high fixed recycling cost has the scale advantages.Similarly,the recycler-led CLSC is consist of a dominant recycler and two competing manufacturers.The manufacturer-one recycles the WEEE.As the above,we assume the recycler's fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information,the government impements the carbon emission RPM on the manufacturers and the recovery rate RPM on the dominant recycler respectively.The key research findings are summarized as follows:(1)Regardless of the recycler's fixed recycling cost type,the carbon emission RPM isn't good for guiding WEEE recycling.While,the recovery rate RPM not only guides WEEE recycling effectively,but also benefits the consumers.(2)The optimal RPM satisfy some conditions: the recovery rate reward-penalty intensity should exceed the critical value with fixed carbon emission reward-penalty intensity;Alternatively,the carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be less than the critical value when the recovery rate reward-penalty intensity is constant.which not only restrain carbon emissions,but also guide WEEE recycling,meanwhile,the consumers benefit from it.(3)In any case,there's always recovery rate and recyclers' profit with high fixed recycling cost are higher than that low fixed recycling cost,which apparently suggests that the high fixed recycling cost has the scale advantages.Moreover,the greater the recovery rate reward-penalty intensity,and the fiercer the competition,the more obvious the scale advantage of high fixed recycling cost.(4)In any case,the products price of manufacturer-one is always lower than that of the manufacturer-two,while the manufacturer-one's profit is always higher than that of manufacturer-two.Apparently,it suggests that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling can gain competitive advantages,moreover,the greater the recovery rate reward-penalty intensity,and the fiercer the competition,the better for the manufacturer-one.(5)The fiercer the competition among manufacturers,the higher the WEEE recovery rate and the system members' benefits.It can be said that competition can benefit the WEEE recycling guidance and system members.