Research On Information Sharing Strategy Of Supply Chain Based On Asymmetric Competition

With the rapid development of big data technology,some enterprises can obtain market demand information of products through data analysis tools,the information sharing decisions of these enterprises will affect their own profits,therefore,how to formulate the optimal information sharing strategy is a problem that managers attach great importance to.In reality,in the supply chain,only retailers may have market demand information,or only manufacturers can predict market demand information,and most manufacturers upstream of retailers are in asymmetric competition.Therefore,for a supply chain consisting of two asymmetrically competitive manufacturers and one retailer,this paper first studies the impact of the retailer's demand information sharing strategy on the three parties in the supply chain,and then considers the impact of the manufacturer's demand information sharing decision on the three parties in the supply chain.It is divided into the following two parts:First of all,this paper discusses a retailer's demand information sharing strategy under asymmetric competition between a strong brand manufacturer and a weak ordinary manufacturer.The retailer has four demand information sharing strategies,namely sharing information with two manufacturers,not sharing information with two manufacturers,only sharing information with the brand manufacturer,and only sharing information with the ordinary manufacturer.Assuming that the retailer first determines the demand information sharing strategy,then the brand manufacturer and the ordinary manufacturer decide their respective wholesale prices successively,and finally,the retailer decides the order quantity,this paper explores the retailer's optimal information sharing decision,and analyzes the retailer's order quantity decision and the wholesale price decision of two competing manufacturers under four information sharing strategies.The results show that when ordinary products cannot completely replace brand products,the retailer's optimal demand information sharing strategy is not to share information with two manufacturers;if the retailer needs to share information with the manufacturer,it will only share the demand information with the manufacturer who makes the decision backward;in addition,the profit of the retailer increases with the decrease of the difference between ordinary products and brand products.Then,this paper considers a supply chain including a large manufacturer,a small manufacturer and a retailer,in which only the large manufacturer can predict the demand information,and the remaining members can only rely on the large manufacturer to share information with themselves.The large manufacturer has four demand information sharing strategies,namely sharing information with the retailer and the small manufacturer,only sharing information with the retailer,only sharing information with the small manufacturer,and not sharing information with the retailer and the small manufacturer.Assuming that the large manufacturer first decides whether to share demand information with the retailer and the small manufacturer and then the two manufacturers decide their respective wholesale prices.At the same time,the retailer decides the marginal profit of two products.This paper explores the optimal information sharing strategy of the large manufacturer and analyzes the impact of the large manufacturer's market share,the intensity of price competition between two manufacturers,and the large manufacturer's forecast accuracy on the returns of supply chain members.The results show that the optimal strategy of the large manufacturer is to share demand information only with the small manufacturer,and the optimal price competition intensity of small manufacturers will increase with the increase of the market share of the large manufacturer.