Research On R&D's Revenue And Risk Distribution Based On Shapley Value

With the deepening of economic globalization, enterprise competition and enterprise external environment changes, greatly enhance the diversity and uncertainty of market demand, enterprises have adopted cooperation in research and development to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises, R & D alliances is in such an environment gradually formed and develop. Members of the R & D alliances dependent on effective cooperation formed a complementary advantages, to win the competitive advantage in the market. However, R & D alliances of the moral risk, adverse selection and profit distribution unfair, resulting in the failure of a large number of R & D alliances. So fair and reasonable profit allocation and risk sharing of R & D alliances operation efficiency and stability is of vital importance.The income distribution method is divided into research and Development Alliance Cooperative Game and non cooperative game method. Cooperative game method emphasizes the collective rationality, a strong external contract assumes that R & D alliances, alliance members for effective cooperation in the framework of contract, thereby eliminating the incentive problem. Cooperative game theory based on axiomatic method defines the distribution of income "fair", "reasonable". Due to different axioms, game solution is different. The Shapley value is to satisfy the anonymity, cooperative game virtual, additive, the only solution is effective, so the value of Shapley is used widely in the distribution of income in R & D alliance. But the value of Shapley and its improvement although the way to meet the fair distribution afterwards, but does not meet the optimal efficiency of Pareto beforehand. That is to say the cooperative game of solving the problem of fairness, they exclude incentive problems. For the solution No incentive problem, realize the optimal Pareto efficiency, scholars adopted the method of non cooperative game, non cooperative game method emphasize individual rationality, assume that the members of the alliance is self-interest. Therefore, it is necessary through design some mechanisms to realize alliance of Pareto optimal efficiency. But the non cooperative game, although it can solve the problem of efficiency, but often ignore the fairness problem.To achieve a fair result, optimal efficiency, need through the mechanism design to intervene, to realize the organic unity of the two. This paper will combine the use of cooperative game and non cooperative game method, based on the game theory, equity theory, incentive theory based on R & D alliances income fair and effective distribution mechanism of specialized study and research, to achieve the unity of fairness and efficiency of R & D alliances income distribution.This paper mainly from the introduction of the third party supervision of the income distribution mechanism, uncertain conditions under the income distribution mechanism, uncertain conditions, such as the risk sharing mechanism of three basic issues.In the income distribution problem analysis, first consider the earnings uncertainty under the condition of income distribution by using Shapley value method for the development of the alliance, as long as meet the budget balance, Shapley value method can meet the fair distribution after the alliance, does not meet the optimal incentive alliance investment can not be achieved in advance, R & D alliances in order to break the Pareto optimal efficiency. The budget supervision mechanism we introduce a third party outside the alliance. If the watchdog observed alliance revenue is greater than or equal to Pareto optimal revenue, so the supervision institution income among the alliance members according to the Shapley value method for the fair distribution of income; If the alliance's income is lower than the Pareto optimal revenue, then members of the alliance will be some punishment, penalty values were normalized to the third party supervision mechanism. In the Nash equilibrium, alliance members just to income distribution, and not to the third-party oversight body of any residual income, can consider giving a party supervision supervision reward. We prove that after the introduction of a third party, the union of Pareto optimal efficiency of R & D investment constitutes a Nash equilibrium, this would resolve the R & D alliances in the income distribution of fairness and efficiency of the conflict.The second study under conditions of uncertainty research income distribution alliance. We assume that R & D Alliance output follows a uniform distribution and normal distribution, when the income of more than a predetermined target alliance alliance income, income in accordance with the Shapley value method for complete distribution in the development of enterprises, once the alliance income is lower than the target income, R & D enterprises will be punished. The punishment value and target income is inversely proportional. Through group punishment mechanism, Pareto can achieve optimal efficiency of R & D alliances, solve the problem of conflicts with Shapley values of fairness and efficiency of the method. Also taking into account the League faces risks, enterprise alliance even effort also don't necessarily reach revenue targets and fined, so as to ensure enterprise alliance to join the alliance, satisfy the participation constraint and supervision should be R & D investment start-up capital, R & D start the size of funds and development and supervision of bargaining power and revenue targets, according to the supervision of the union to bring the contribution, the total revenue alliance between corporate R & D, R & D and supervision between distributive justice.The final analysis of the risks in the development process may face, because the members of the League to bear the risk, some companies are risk averse, some enterprises are risk neutral, some enterprises are risk preference, so consider the sharing of risk in enterprise according to the risk attitude, sharing in the benefits at the same time to achieve and improve the member the difference between alliance return and risk. Through the design of a risk sharing mechanism to improve the direct distribution, and Shapley value distribution mechanism is different, in the direct allocation mechanism, each enterprise gain is the function of the alliance's total revenue, which is not a function of marginal revenue. This mechanism satisfies two properties: one is the fairness of the expected return the direct distribution of expected income and the mechanism of Shapley enterprise value mechanism to achieve the Shapley value equal to the sense of justice; the two is to improve the league is under certain conditions Qualitative equivalent income, to achieve the effective risk sharing between different enterprises.