| The promotion of Electric vehicle is an effective means to alleviate the energy crisis and environmental pollution,and an important way to achieve carbon emission reduction and green development.At present,its main promotion methods include vehicle sales,public transportation and car-sharing leasing.Restricted by battery technology and charging facilities,consumers have concerns about purchasing of electric vehicles privately,while public transport mainly focuses on administrative promotion,and its absorption is limited.In terms of the promotion way,it gives the first place to Vehicle sales,public transportation and car-sharing.Restricted by battery technology and charging facilities,consumers have concerns about purchasing electric vehicles,while public transportation mainly focuses on administrative promotion,with limited absorption.As a model of the shared economy,the sharing of electric vehicles has become the primary means for consumers to contact and understand the electric vehicles,and plays a link role in the promotion of electric vehicles from administrative to market-oriented.However,there are also some problems in the process of promoting the market of electric vehicles sharing,such as fewer leasing outlets,inadequate charging facilities and limited coverage.Therefore,many car-sharing alliances of electric vehicles have been set up by various market participants,hoping to resolve the current development bottleneck through resource sharing.Then,what is the market competition like before the formation of the car-sharing alliance for electric vehicles? And how is the motivation,stability and scientific mechanism of income distribution for members of industrial alliance? It has become the focus of relevant enterprises,and is also a new problem needed to be solved urgently by academia and practitioners.Under such background,this paper makes some theoretical analysis on the formation process and income distribution scheme of electric vehicle sharing by building the game model.In terms of research thoughts,we first clarify the game mechanism of the electric vehicle sharing market before the formation of the alliance,clarify the evolutionary stability of the market and the optimal coping strategies of the players;then we analyze the feasibility and stability of the formation of the alliance,and find out the conditions for the formation of the alliance;finally,we discuss the profit distribution mechanism among members after the formation of the alliance.The main research contents and corresponding conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Solving the problems of market competition after a large number of car-sharing companies enter the market in the early stage of the formation of the electric vehicle sharing market.Under the assumption of limited rationality,and by constructing an evolutionary game model,this study reveals the game process of car-sharing software platform entering and exiting the market and seizing the market.On the basis of proving the general existence of game equilibrium,this paper concretely analyses the model combined with the most used price war in the current sharing market,and explores the evolutionarily stable strategy of the market and the optimal coping strategies of the players after the sudden impact of a company's price war strategy on the market.The research shows that there is no pure strategy evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS),when the market is under the impact of price war lunched by a company.However,there must be an evolutionary stable state of the hybrid strategy.For companies that are ready to enter the market or want to expand their market share,the best strategy is to lunch a price war.And for companies that are already operating in the market,the best responsive strategy is to cut price.Theoretical explanation is given for the existence of ESS in car-sharing market competition,which offers guidance on pricing strategy of the car rental company.(2)Aiming at the problems such as fewer leasing outlets,inadequate charging facilities and limited coverage in the promotion process of sharing for electric vehicles.According to the actual operation structure of electric vehicle sharing alliance,this study refines the coalitional game model of cooperation between a power company and two car-sharing companies.Firstly,this paper analyses the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding income distribution of the power company and the car-sharing company under the market mechanism;secondly,it analyses the influence of the formation of strategic alliance on the profits of the game players,and discusses the changes of the optimal pricing strategy and income distribution mechanism of the power company and the car-sharing company;finally,it discusses the stability of the alliance,and analyzes the cooperative alliance of car-sharing market in Chongqing.The results show that the formation of strategic alliances of car-sharing market can not only guarantee the interests of the power companies,but also improve the revenue of the car-sharing companies.At the same time,it can also give consumers lower rental prices which is conducive to the promotion and development of electric vehicles.However,the members of the alliance have motivation and incentive to deviate from the pricing constraints of the alliance.They can get higher returns through the default period.In the infinite repetitive game,the members of the alliance will decide whether or not to violate the pricing constraints of the alliance through long-term total returns.The rate of return on investment pursued by enterprises has an important impact on the stability of the alliance.The higher the rate of return on investment,the easier it is to cross the critical point.Especially under the bounded rationality,the short-term behavior is more obvious,which is also the fundamental reason for the high failure rate of the alliance.(3)Aiming at the problems of interest distribution among Alliance Members.Considering whether there is a binding cooperative contract between the participants,there are two basic analysis methods.One is the multi-person bargain model based on non-cooperative game theory,the other is the Shapley value method based on cooperative game theory(Maskin,2007).In this study,we propose a revenue allocation scheme under different alliance states(with or without binding).Firstly,under the hypothesis of non-cooperative game(the alliance is not binding),we analyze the income distribution among the participants in the electric vehicle sharing industry and discuss the distribution process of excess profits between the car-sharing company and the power company by constructing a multi-to-multi-bargain model.It is found that under the condition that the initial strategy is randomly generated,the evolutionarily stable state of the game must be a strict Nash equilibrium,and converges to the symmetric Nash equilibrium(5-5 fraction)with the maximum probability,and to other strict Nash equilibrium with the probability as the center decreases toward both sides,showing a symmetrical distribution.The expected value of the distribution ratio of excess profits between the group of car-sharing companies and the group of power companies is "five to five shares".Secondly,under the cooperative game hypothesis(the alliance has binding force),we use the Shapley value to analyze the income distribution among the participants in the electric vehicle sharing industry.Taking an industrial alliance consists of a power company and two car-sharing companies as an example,we provide the derivation process of the benefit of the alliance subset,and the optimal allocation based on marginal contribution is solved using Shapley value method. |
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