Reform Of The Collective Forests Property Rights From The View Of Bureaucracy

The reform of collective forest rights as another major rural management system reform receives great attention from the central to local governments and groups. The active participation of forestry production has been achieved for forestry farmers, at the same time, households’forestry income was significantly increased and employment channels are greatly expanded, promote the collective forests areas’social benefits. But some problems have gradually emerged with success. For one thing, the relevant supporting policies are not completed which is disadvantageous for farmers to been active in forestry management. Moreover, the relationships among local governments, village collective and villagers are not rationalized, affect the relevant subjects advance the collective forest rights reform. This article try to improve the collective forest property rights theory through the bureaucratic view, a clear status and the respective responsibilities, rights and benefits of the main subjects in the collective forest bureaucratic system can make up the defects of collective forest tenure reform theory, the results can be widely used in public ownership system reform. Moreover, this paper established the bureaucratic model of collective forest property rights to analyze the behavior of property rights rules in different hierarchies, analyzed the stakeholders’interest demands and game behavior to reveal their influential action factors, provide advices to reduce the level of the objects’opportunistic behavior and improve the reform policies efficiency.This article studied the property right reform of collective forests from the view of bureaucracy, by reviewing the change of the collective forest property rights since the founding of new China and analyzing property right in each stage, we summarized the characteristic of collective forest property rights changes and analyzed the motive of the ongoing reform. We established the hierarchical structure model of collective forest property rights, and through it we analyzed the distribution of sub-rights at all levels of the of property rights and the levels’behavior rule; At the central government level, we compared the costs with the benefits of the implementation of collective forest tenure reform adopted the SSP analysis framework, analyzed the system change modes in different stages of collective forest property rights reform, and the system supply model was used to the analyzed the reform system supply situation of the central government. At the local government and collective level, we analyzed reasons and manifestations of the policy implementation blocks; At the household level, descriptive statistics was used to analyze whether the equity and efficiency goals achieved during the reform of collective forest rights based on the field research data in nine provinces; By the analysis of the stakeholders’different interests, game process, the game results and relative cases, we described the methods to improve the political efficiency of collective forest right reform; and then the main conclusions, Innovative points and limitations were summarized in the end.Normative and empirical study methods were jointly applied in the research. The normative study method was mainly used to analyze the hierarchical model of collective forest property rights structure, the implementation of the reform of collective forest rights in central and local government levels, etc. The empirical study methods consisted of Descriptive Statistics, The Game Theory, etc. More specifically, Descriptive Statistics was used to analyze whether the equity and efficiency goals achieved during the reform of collective forest rights at the farm level. The starting point fairness of woodland distribution, opportunity fair of farmers as forest land transferee and equitable benefits of forestry were used to measure the equity goal. Farmer’s subjective evaluation on the reform of collective forest rights, comparison of investment in forestry production before and after the reform, forestry income and its proportion total household income were used to analyze the efficiency goal. Game theory methods were applied to the analysis of the game process and the game results among stakeholders of the reform of collective forest rights.The main conclusions of the study include: 1) frequent changes of collective forest property rights adversely affect the implementation of the ongoing collective forest rights reform; 2) the state and collective should empowering farmers fully; 3) the benefits outweigh the costs for central government to implement collective forest rights reform, but there is still insufficient in system supply; 4) The Blocks of the policy implementation arises during Local government carry out collective forest rights reform; 5) the collective forest tenure reform achieve efficiency in a certain degree but did not fully achieve fairness to the farmers; and 6) stakeholders will Implement plan during the reform of collective forest rights focus on their self-interests, the results may lead to the central government’s goal shifted, so appropriate measures to improve the efficiency of policy should be implemented based on the characteristics of their games.