| The reform of collective property rights system is an important support and guarantee for the liberation of rural productivity,the promotion of agricultural development,the prosperity of farmers and the prosperity of rural areas.As the main body of the reform of collective property rights system,the development of economic cooperatives is inseparable from the coordinated efforts of the government,managers and farmers.In the process of construction and operation of economic cooperatives,there is information asymmetry between managers and farmers,which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard behavior of managers,which greatly damages the interests of farmers and hinders the development and reform of economic cooperatives.Based on this,according to the stage characteristics of the collective property rights system reform,the reform process is divided into the operation period and the construction period,and the interest relationship between the subjects in different stages of the reform is analyzed.The moral hazard and adverse selection behavior of the managers are avoided through contract design,and the goal of maximizing the interests of farmers is realized.In addition,by comparing the interests of farmers at different stages of establishing employment relationships,the best time for economic cooperatives(farmers)to establish employment relationships with managers is obtained.The conclusions are as follows :(1)There is a substitution effect between the efforts of the manager and the efforts of the farmer.One party ’s efforts can reduce the efforts of the other party.The degree of effort paid by farmers is only related to its cost coefficient and the number of collective assets,and is not affected by information asymmetry.(2)When the manager ’s management ability is high,the economic cooperation society provides low fixed payment and high profit sharing proportional contract.On the contrary,when the management ability of managers is low,the economic cooperation society provides high fixed payment and low profit sharing proportional contract.Under information asymmetry,the ability of low-type managers has no effect on the high-type contract structure,while the ability of high-type managers is positively correlated with the fixed payment under low-type and negatively correlated with the profit sharing ratio.(3)Under information asymmetry,economic cooperatives need to pay information rent to identify the type of manager ’s ability,so information asymmetry often causes losses to farmers,and the greater the ability gap between high-type managers and low-type managers,the more information rent economic cooperatives need to pay.In addition,the probability of economic cooperatives successfully entering the business period and the risk coefficient of managers reduce the incentive effect of the contract.(4)When the greater the influence coefficient of managers in the construction period,the more the collective assets,the lower the ability of managers,the more economic cooperatives should establish employment relationship with managers in the construction period.When the greater the influence coefficient of farmers in the operation period,the greater the probability of economic cooperatives successfully entering the operation period,the stronger the ability of managers(the higher the ability of managers),the more economic cooperatives should establish employment relationship with managers in the operation period.In addition,the timing of economic cooperatives hiring managers also depends on the opportunity cost of managers in both cases. |
