Research On Anti-Monopoly Regulation Of Killer Acquisitions By Platform Enterprises

With the progress of computer technology and the development of platform economy,largescale platform enterprises represented by Google,Amazon,Facebook,Apple(GAFA)and Baidu,Alibaba and Tencent(BAT)have emerged.These platform enterprises have played a positive role in promoting the vigorous development of economy and improving people’s quality of life,and provided great convenience for consumers in entertainment,consumption,communication,travel and medical care.With the rapid expansion of platform enterprises,problems have followed.Some platform enterprises expand the market through mergers and acquisitions of start-ups or new enterprises,improve the market access threshold,eliminate potential competitors,and block the possibility of the development of start-ups,resulting in anti-competitive effects in the field of platform economy,such as reducing competitiveness,hindering product innovation,and reducing consumer welfare.However,the concealment of killer acquisitions increases the difficulty of antimonopoly law enforcement in China,and it is difficult for China’s anti-monopoly law to provide a complete system guarantee,which leads to the embarrassing situation of weak regulation of killer acquisitions by platform enterprises in China.Therefore,it is necessary to re-examine the centralized regulation system of operators in China in order to effectively deal with the challenges brought by platform enterprises’ killer acquisitions to the anti-monopoly law.Based on the actual situation in China,it is suggested to adopt the dual regulation system of "transaction amount +turnover",improve the framework of competition damage,and strengthen the anti-monopoly supervision afterwards in order to effectively regulate the killer acquisitions by platform enterprises.The thesis is mainly divided into the following four parts.The first part is the basic theory of anti-monopoly regulation of killer acquisitions by platform enterprises.Firstly,it introduces the origin of killer acquisitions by platform enterprises,and analyzes the differences between killer acquisitions by platform enterprises,traditional mergers and killer acquisitions of pharmaceutical industry.Secondly,it discusses the anticompetitive effect of killer acquisitions by platform enterprises.Then through the analysis of objective illegal elements and subjective responsibility elements,the composition of platform enterprises’ killer acquisitions is proved.Finally,the necessity of regulating platform enterprises’ killer acquisitions is expounded from the value dimension.The second part is some problems existing in the process of regulating killer acquisitions by platform enterprises in China.First of all,from the current provisions of the anti-monopoly law,killer acquisitions by platform enterprises are outside the radiation scope of the anti-monopoly law,the turnover standard can’t effectively identify killer acquisitions by platform enterprises,and the active investigation power of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies is also a mere formality,and the traditional anti-monopoly damage analysis framework in China is difficult to adapt to the characteristics of dynamic competition in the platform economy.Due to the serious information asymmetry between platform enterprises and anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies,the overuse of prudential supervision principle and the lack of post-event review,China’s antimonopoly supervision is absent.The third part introduces the specific experience of killer acquisitions by platform enterprises outside the region.The European Union,Germany and the United States have made many useful explorations in this field.First,the European Union took the lead in putting forward the gatekeeper system,endow core platforms with special obligations and strengthen the supervision of digital giants.Secondly,the Ninth Amendment to the German Anti-Restrictive Competition Law also considers that the existing threshold of merger declaration is not enough to cover all mergers and acquisitions in the field of platform economy.Therefore,the transaction volume standard is proposed to make the transactions with low turnover but high purchase price subject to anti-monopoly review.Finally,the United States tried to dilute the relevant market definition in order to solve the problem of the failure of relevant market definition methods in the field of platform economy.These experiences have important reference significance to our country.In the fourth part,on the basis of clarifying the specific dilemma of Chinese anti-monopoly legislation and law enforcement,combining with foreign experience,the author puts forward the perfect opinions on the anti-monopoly regulation of Chinese killer acquisitions by platform enterprises.In the aspect of improving the reporting standard,increase the trading volume standard on the basis of the turnover,and set up the special reporting obligation of large platform enterprises;In the aspect of establishing competition damage standards,we should improve the damage assessment standards by adopting a broad definition method of relevant markets,comprehensively considering "non-price" factors,and reversing the burden of proof.Finally,in strengthening post-event supervision,we can set up a special digital management department and conduct post-event investigation if necessary,hoping to optimize the supervision of relevant departments in China and break the dilemma of anti-monopoly law enforcement in China through a series of measures.