Research On Antitrust Regulation Of Platform Enterprise’ Killer Acquisitions

As the core of the digital economy,the platform economy is profoundly affecting people’s lifestyles.To ensure the sustainable and healthy development of the platform economy,the implementation of normalized regulation of platform enterprises is a key initiative in line with the current development trend of the platform economy.The normalized regulation of platform enterprises should not only prevent "monopoly",but also give play to the network effect of data elements and the characteristics that are conducive to the later catching up,and should put more emphasis on protecting the "competitiveness" of the market,and constantly encourage the later and the innovators to enter and compete with the existing market The market should be more "competitive" by encouraging later entrants and innovators to enter and compete with existing market players.However,in the current platform economy,large platform companies are merging and acquiring start-ups to eliminate potential competitors and increase their monopoly power,which has been noticed by scholars and law enforcement agencies in Europe,the United States and China,and has been named "Killer Acquisitions".The "Killer Acquisitions" are harmful to competition and innovation and therefore need to be regulated by anti-monopoly law.Unfortunately,antitrust enforcement agencies are facing a series of challenges in regulating "Killer Acquisitions" under the current antitrust framework,and further investigation is needed to optimize the regulatory approach.Based on the above background,this paper discusses the antitrust regulation of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises in China.In addition to the introduction and conclusion,the paper is divided into four parts.The first part is an overview of the "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises.The main part of the paper is to explain the characteristics of platform enterprises,such as cross-border,network effect,bilateral market,and user lock-in effect,which make the competition of platform enterprises very complicated.By describing the subject,object,purpose and method of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises,we can better clarify which behaviors of platform enterprises belong to "Killer Acquisitions".The introduction of the types of "Killer Acquisitions" will enable the antitrust authorities to more accurately identify and regulate the "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises.In the second part,we analyze the current situation and hazards of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises.The current situation of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform companies in China is illustrated by the overall investment and "Killer Acquisitions" situation of large platform companies in China and the case of "Di Di M&A Uber China".Then,we will elaborate on the hazards of "Killer Acquisitions" from two perspectives: competition and innovation.On the one hand,the "Killer Acquisitions" of platform companies have caused negative impacts on competition by reducing competitors’ market dominance,expanding data barriers,and causing cross-industry transmission of market power.On the other hand,the "Killer Acquisitions" of platform companies can inhibit innovation in both directions.Not only does it negatively affect innovation on the startup side by weakening their incentives to innovate,interfering with their innovation direction,and affecting their access to innovation venture capital,but it also has a "reverse strangulation" effect on the purchaser’s own innovation.In the third part,we discuss the antitrust regulatory dilemma of platform companies’ "Killer Acquisitions" from two levels: reporting and review.The first part analyzes the limitations of the reporting standards and the active investigation power of the review authority in the ex ante reporting of "Killer Acquisitions" by platform companies.Secondly,we analyze the dilemmas of regulating the "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises at the review level: the free model poses challenges to the traditional method of defining the relevant market,and it is easy to ignore the potential relevant data market and the relevant data technology market;the assessment of the damage effect faces biased considerations,limited analytical tools,and theoretical analysis.When assessing the effect of damages,the company faces the problems of biased considerations,limited analytical tools,and uncertainties in the application of analytical theories;when designing remedial measures,the company finds that there is a lack of remedies in law enforcement practice and it is difficult to implement remedial actions.In the fourth part,we propose a solution to the specific problems of the antitrust regulation of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises,and improve the antitrust regulation of "Killer Acquisitions" of platform enterprises.The following two points are proposed to address the limitations of ex ante notification: introducing supplementary threshold value standards for transaction value,and improving the active investigation power of law enforcement agencies in terms of substance and procedure.With regard to the dilemma of review: in response to the difficult problem of defining the relevant market,it is suggested to adopt a definition method that is in line with the characteristics of the digital economy and focus on defining the potential relevant data market and the relevant data technology market;in response to the problem of damage effect assessment,specific suggestions are made for the correction of consideration factors,innovation of analysis tools,and improvement of analysis theory: focus on the consideration of innovation and privacy protection factors,introduce the damage balance standard,presumption of illegality This paper suggests that the principle of unilateral effect and synergistic effect should be used to analyze the damage theory.