Anti-monopoly Regulation On Strangling Mergers And Acquisitions Of Digital Platform Enterprises

In order to maintain their market position and eliminate potential competition,large digital platform companies often launch stranglehold mergers and acquisitions for platform startups that have just been established but have great potential for development.A single acquisition will not have a significant impact on the market structure,but in the long run,this "sausage cutting" type of systematic and large-scale acquisition will greatly harm competition.It can also hinder innovation and reduce consumer welfare.However,there are many shortcomings in the current concentration reporting standards,antitrust analysis framework,and ex post remedies and penalties,making it easy for platform companies to escape antitrust regulations through stifling mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,antitrust regulators should change their enforcement philosophy of inaction,adjust the threshold for concentration reporting,improve the antitrust analysis framework,optimize ex post relief and punishment measures,achieve effective regulation of stifling mergers and acquisitions,and promote high-quality development of the digital economy.In order to maintain their market position and eliminate potential competition,large digital platform enterprises usually launch stifling mergers and acquisitions of newly established platform startups with great development potential.A single merger will not have much impact on the structure of the market,but over time such salami slicing,systematic mergers of scale can do great damage to competition.It also hampers innovation and reduces consumer welfare.However,there are many deficiencies in both the law enforcement philosophy of the antitrust regulators and the framework of the antitrust review of the concentration of operators,which leads to the inability of the antitrust law enforcement agencies to achieve accurate identification and effective regulation of stifle mergers and acquisitions.In terms of law enforcement concept,antitrust regulators mistakenly regard "inclusive and prudent" law enforcement concept as negative regulation,and often turn a blind eye to stifling mergers and acquisitions of digital platform enterprises.At the level of the anti-monopoly review framework of operator concentration,first of all,the single turnover declaration standard is insufficient to deal with the strangling of digital platform enterprises,which often makes strangling free from the threshold of operator concentration declaration.Secondly,the characteristics of platform economy,such as bilateral market,network effect,free operation and dynamic competition,make the traditional methods of market definition,market power identification and competition damage assessment difficult to play an effective role.At the same time,traditional structural relief is not suitable for highly innovative platform economy.In view of this,anti-monopoly regulators should change their negative law enforcement philosophy,truly understand the law enforcement concept of "modesty" under the regulatory principle of "tolerance and prudence",and realize the legislative spirit and legislative purpose of anti-monopoly law through impartial and appropriate law enforcement.In the reporting standard of operators concentration,the introduction of transaction volume and flow standard as a supplement to the turnover reporting threshold.In the process of market definition,market power identification and competition damage assessment,the economic characteristics of the platform should be fully considered,the traditional static test method based on price should be changed,innovation and consumer privacy protection should be included in the competition damage assessment criteria,the competition damage assessment tools should be improved,and an antitrust analysis framework in line with the economic characteristics of the platform should be established.In the aspect of ex post relief,more emphasis is placed on behavioral ex post relief measures.