Anti Monopoly Regulation Of Stranglehold Mergers And Acquisitions On Large Platforms

In recent years,stranglehold mergers and acquisitions have spread rapidly in the platform economy.Many large platform companies have launched a series of mergers and acquisitions aimed at start-ups in order to expand their businesses,acquire key market elements,and eliminate potential innovation and competition.Faced with the capital and competitive advantages of large platform companies,besieged startups often face a dilemma of being "acquired at a premium" or "shut down by a run.".In the long run,stranglehold mergers and acquisitions will significantly reduce the competitiveness of the digital market and the innovation motivation of start-ups,ultimately damaging the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.However,at present,China’s anti monopoly regulations against stranglehold mergers and acquisitions in the platform field are facing significant challenges.On the one hand,due to the particularity of platform companies themselves,they have new characteristics such as bilateral market characteristics,network effects,and non neutral price structures,which pose new challenges to anti monopoly regulations.On the other hand,due to the imperfect system design,The prior declaration system based on turnover is difficult to include stranglehold mergers and acquisitions in the regulatory scope.At the same time,antitrust law enforcement agencies also face significant difficulties in analyzing competition damage.In addition,the ex post relief system for stranglehold mergers and acquisitions needs to be improved.In response to the above difficulties,the author believes that on the one hand,we need to establish diversified pre reporting standards as soon as possible,introducing transaction volume and user size standards as important supplements,and also need to establish a special list of reporting obligations,requiring designated leading platforms to assume the obligation of active reporting,so as to bring stifling mergers and acquisitions from the source into the regulatory scope.On the other hand,in view of the scarcity of law enforcement forces,it is necessary to improve the review efficiency of law enforcement agencies by establishing a classified and hierarchical review system,improving the relevant market definition methods in the platform field,introducing motivational evidence,and inverting the burden of proof.In addition,it is also necessary to further improve the supervision trustee system,improve the enforcement dispute arbitration mechanism,and improve the ex post relief system of antitrust regulations.Through the above modifications and improvements,it is expected to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust regulations for stifling mergers and acquisitions in China.