Anti-monopoly Regulation Of Digital Platform Killer Acquisitions

The digital platform business model,which evolved from the continuous advancement of digital technology,has an unprecedented impact on human society in terms of depth and breadth,posing a comprehensive challenge to antitrust law that serves as the "economic constitution".Digital platform killer acquisitions are a special type of concentration of undertakings that may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.Their essence is to enhance market power,eliminate competition constraints,and become platform enterprises of digital trusts that abuse market power to carry out unequal acquisitions of start-ups.First,the differences in the legal relationship subjects of various platform enterprises after rapid evolution must be clarified.The synergy of ultimate network externalities and efficient user lock-in effects played by data is the main driving force for digital platforms to implement killer acquisitions,and the lack of mechanisms for entrepreneurs to exit the killing zone and killer acquisitions jointly promote a vicious cycle.Digital platform killer acquisitions will have hidden and far-reaching negative externalities on the competitive structure of digital markets in the long-term dynamic level.Their harmful effects often appear late,but if the damage is ignored,start-ups with the greatest disruptive innovation potential will lose their living space.Once the pattern of excessive concentration of data around large platforms is formed,competition will not occur universally,and the metabolic order of market competition will collapse,while profit-seeking will drive platforms to excessively demand privacy information from consumers,and consumer welfare will be deprived of non-price rights such as the right to choose and privacy.China does not yet have a corresponding regulatory framework and regulatory case law.The existing relevant legislation lacks systematicity and pertinence,and there are many problems in law enforcement,such as insufficient understanding of its impact and harm,backward identification tools,and unsuitable jurisdictional system.China’s antitrust regulation of new technologies and new models is usually tolerant and cautious,but various evidence shows that it is not accurately implemented.Under the impact of non-price factors represented by attention,the methods and tools of traditional merger review at each step are at risk of failure,and relevant market definition is difficult to continue,which in turn shakes the prerequisite for evaluating the market power of digital enterprises.At the same time,the harm effect of platform killer acquisitions is not accurately measured,and the concentration declaration and review are also in a dilemma.Recently,outside the domain,the latest legislative trend of tightening antitrust regulations for digital enterprises has significant commonalities and distinct characteristics.The European Union,the United States,and Japan have all adopted the regulatory paradigm of "establishing specialized standards-implementing targeted regulation",while each has its own characteristics.China needs to focus on long-term and dynamic competition order,provide preferential protection for innovation and start-ups,and strengthen the preventive and multi-departmental coordination of antitrust supervision.Introduce the principle of illegality in specific areas at the right time and introduce fuzzy comprehensive evaluation in the assessment of harm.Take substantive competition as the criterion and adjust individual cases by replacing analysis variables,and establish a step-by-step application system for defining methods under the premise of returning market definition to its instrumental function.Emphasis should be placed on building a gatekeeper system,focusing on assessing the impact of non-price factors on market power,establishing the special status of large platforms,imposing specialized notice obligations on mergers and acquisitions,and reversing the burden of proof in merger review to achieve targeted regulation and eliminate information asymmetry in regulatory agencies.